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
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No. 14.

HERBART AND FROEBEL:

AN ATTEMPT AT SYNTHESIS

BY

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CENTRAL MISSOURI
STATE UNIVERSITY
Warrensburg,
Missouri

PUBLISHED BY
TEACHERS COLLEGE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK

1907

BRANDOW PRINTING CO.,
ALBANY, N. Y.

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INTRODUCTION.

The notion of a synthesis of Herbart and Froebel was first suggested to the writer by Professor John Adams, of London University, in 1905. Already the outline of a synthesis has appeared in an article in the *Educational Review*, written by Professor Welton, and entitled *A Synthesis of Herbart and Froebel*.¹ Dr. F. H. Hayward, himself an able Herbartian writer, has admitted that this phrase suggests the vision of a third educational "Secret," beyond the secrets that seem to him to have been disclosed in the respective works of Froebel and of Herbart.² The article by Professor Welton is suggestive, and only too slight. A more inclusive comparative study has been made by Professor MacVannel, of Columbia University.³ With the work of Professor Welton and of Professor MacVannel the present attempt at a synthesis is in general accord. Like both of these, it assumes the practical value of a philosophy of education. It is, however, widely differentiated, as to its aims, from the former by its scope, and from the latter by a less historical mode of approach. The writer is deeply indebted to Professor MacVannel, as well for his aid in the present undertaking as for his invaluable contributions to a philosophy of education.

In the present dissertation, the term synthesis has been broadly interpreted. At the same time it has not been used to denote an *aggregation* of the educational principles of Froebel and of Herbart. Neither is it intended to imply that in cases where Herbart may be said to maintain a thesis, and Froebel an antithesis, anything like an equal validity need always be attributed to the respective principles that may be emphasised by each. That which is sought is neither an aggregation of principles, nor an indifference to them, nor a forced equality of emphasis upon them, but a type of synthesis that may be called organic. The term *organic* may be opposed to *mechanical*, or to

¹September, 1900.

²*The Secret of Herbart*. London, 1904. p. vii.

³*The Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel*. Teachers College, New York. 1905.

that piecemeal or mosaic type of eclecticism which is not uncommon in the literature of education. Perhaps an organic synthesis may be taken to imply at once an endeavour for approximate consistency, and a repudiation of the attribute of finality. The value of the synthesis is likely to depend upon the breadth and depth of the interpretation of experience which it may convey. For the essential implication of a synthesis is a higher standpoint, a broader view, than those that are to be reconciled. Such a standpoint, such a view, should be possible in the light of a more recent philosophy.

Probably there are those who may feel that in the following pages something is to a degree read into Herbart and Froebel; and that the result is more akin to an outline of a philosophy of education than to the more limited reconciliation of two historic systems of educational thought. Such criticism is not unwillingly accepted. In a sense, to read a fuller meaning into Herbart and Froebel is the very purpose and final cause of the synthesis. The problem is philosophical, and to a degree even metaphysical; but it is also eminently practical. For at present one of the chief practical difficulties in American education is the synthesis, or articulation, or reconciliation, of the primary school with the kindergarten. The primary school tends to be dominated by the ideas of Herbart, as the kindergarten is dominated by the ideas of Froebel; so that there is apparently a need of a synthetic theory of education which may tend to the more amicable reconstruction of them both.

Below are given the specific aims of the present attempt at a synthesis.

1. To review the educational theories of Herbart and Froebel in the light of the philosophies which they imply.
2. To compare and interpret those theories of Herbart and Froebel which concern reality, consciousness and character.
3. To adjust in a measure the emphasis of Herbart upon culture, instruction and mental content with the emphasis of Froebel upon nature, self-activity and will.

One can only set Froebel upon the philosophical plane of Herbart by crediting him with what is implied as well as what is expressed in his educational theory. This done, he is often found to be in close sympathy with modern thought. Froebel, indeed, was a man of wide and deep reading. He twice rejected

the opportunity to become a university professor. He had read eagerly as a boy and a student; and his reading as a man included the *Levana* of Richter, the writings of Arndt and Novalis, the *Bruno* of Schelling, the works of Pestalozzi, and the *Ideal of Humanity* and the *Journal of Human Life* of Krause.¹ "The *Sonntagsblatt*," writes Eleonore Heerwart, "leads us to a further conclusion concerning Froebel: he was a man of wide reading. Not only does every number bear as a motto at the beginning expressions of famous men, but also 'voices' and short biographical notices of such men as tended to ratify his views of education and of life."² Such evidence of culture, it is true, bears no comparison to the profound scholarship of Herbart. Its value is to indicate, with a greater degree of certainty, the source and spirit of many of the ideas of Froebel which in themselves are less comprehensible.

¹Cf. Hanschmann. *Friedrich Froebel*. Eisenach, 1874. p. 27, p. 47, p. 41, p. 168, etc.

²Wilhelmine, *Froebels erste Gattin*. Eisenach, 1905. p. 219.

CHAPTER I.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FROEBEL.

In his optimism, his will to believe, and his proclivity towards assumptions, Froebel had an entire school of contemporary thought to bear him company. For the appeal to faith as equal in authority to reason, the tendency to mysticism in expression, and symbolism in thought, and the supremacy of the synthetic over the analytic view, are to be regarded as marks not of Froebel only, but of romanticists generally, including the Schlegels, Tieck, Schleiermacher, Novalis, and Schelling. Science, art, religion and philosophy were all one to romanticism, for a common feeling unified them and manifested them as aspects of a unitary and organic life. Thus Froebel would have none of the warning of an academic friend, that he should be guarded against philosophy which leads to doubt and darkness, but welcome art, the giver of life and joy.¹ As to Schelling, so to Froebel, philosophy was an art, and art a philosophy, so that when either speaks as one who prophesieth, understanding nothing, he is apt to compensate for an occasional lack of lucidity by the certainty of his intuition.² It is in vain to expect of either Froebel or Schelling a scholastic systematisation of his contributions to the life of the spirit.

Froebel appears to draw his inspiration now from Schelling, now again from Fichte. In general, he follows Schelling when his discourse is of nature, or of symbolism, or when he takes an esthetic view of things; but Fichte, whenever he thinks in terms of morality, personality, will, duty, or citizenship. Among the philosophers contemporary with Froebel, Krause had already effected a similar synthesis. To Krause Froebel wrote a long autobiographical letter; and in return Krause sent Froebel his books. Between these two there existed certain personal affinities. Both were Thuringians, both sons of clergymen, both inured to a certain measure of poverty and hardship, both lovers of nature from their youth, both wanderers according to the standard of their period and nation, and both contemporaries

¹*Autobiography*. Translated by Michaelis and Moore. Syracuse, N. Y. 1889. p. 40.

²*Cf.* Schelling, *Clara*. Stuttgart, 1865. p. 175.

save for Krause's advantage of a single year and for his comparatively early death.¹ Yet despite all these coincidences their lives as educators were by no means similar. For Froebel, although he had deep philosophical interests, a love of learning, and opportunities for advancement in the universities of Berlin and Sweden,² lay under an inner compulsion of which the conscientious Krause knew nothing, to be a *Menschenbildner*.³ Thus it was not Krause with his four daughters and eight sons, but the childless Froebel, who became the passionate lover and devoted teacher of children.

Similarity of philosophical and religious convictions drew Froebel and Krause close together. In a review in *Isis*, which he wrote in 1823 upon Froebel's essay of the preceding year,⁴ Krause attempted to call attention to the entire harmony of that essay with his own expressions of 1811 in *Das Urbild der Menschheit* and *Tagblatt des Menschheit Lebens*. Indeed, quite in common with Krause,⁵ Froebel was convinced of the congruence of religion and science, the harmony of reason and art, the unity of mankind, the value of social service, theism as against pantheism, the dominance of the religious view in life, the might of love, the indivisibility of moral worth and beauty, and the freedom of the will as obeying only the law of its own idea. As with Krause, so with Froebel, God is permanent yet ever changing and working in all things as *natura naturans*, transcendent yet immanent, with even something of a special stress on the immanence. For them both, nature is through and through spiritual, and endowed with a tranquil constancy all her own. For them both, man for his part is essentially social, the sexes are spiritually and intellectually co-ordinate and equal, and the family is the chief institute of education, although by no means to the extent of the exclusion of education from the national concern. For the rest, Froebel had a more unitary conception of mind and body than Krause, who treated man as a triune bodily, mental, and spiritual being. Krause for his part had a universality conceivably beyond even Froebel's, since he desired the name of the school of Froebel at Keilhau to be changed from *Allge-*

¹Krause, b. 1781, d. 1832. Froebel, b. 1782, d. 1852.

²The University of Stockholm.

³Cf. Hanschmann, *Friedrich Froebel*. Eisenach, 1874. p. 101.

⁴*Ueber deutsche Erziehung, überhaupt.*

⁵Cf. *Ueber Krause und Froebel*. Paul Hohlfeld. Dresden, 1873. *passim*. Also Hanschmann, *Friedrich Froebel*. p. 148 sqq.

meine deutsche Erziehungsanstalt to the broader title, *Reinmenschliche Erziehungsanstalt für Deutsche*. But this appeal of Krause to the catholicity of the ideals of the school of Rousseau perhaps lacks the happiness of the self-identification of Froebel with the surging forces of nationality.

As a direct discipline of Krause and Schelling,¹ Froebel developed a world-view on the basis of a daring idealism. His own temperament inclined to the artistic, and was not averse even to mystic tendencies. His philosophy, then, is no cautious critique; but neither need it be viewed as a closed system. It is, perhaps, none the less a philosophy because here and there it may lie open to ridicule, and oftener to misinterpretation. To adequately analyse his view of education is indeed to trace the ramifications of a wealth of overlapping categories. The problems of development, nature, spirit, will, society, and duty need to be examined and related in thought. At any rate as they are coming to be used in current educational literature, the well-worn categories of unity, development and self-activity seem to furnish an inadequate clue by which to unravel such a labyrinth of fundamental questions as confronts us here. Let us rather borrow from Froebel the scheme of the *Menschen Erziehung*, to the extent merely of discussing in succession his philosophy of nature, his philosophy of man, and his philosophy of the absolute.

I.

It seemed to Kant, the philosopher of Königsberg, that since, according to his analysis, the outer world can only produce sensations, or the raw material of knowledge, whereas the mind is much more than sensations, or their sum or product, it should follow that mind must be possessed of an a priori synthetic activity of its own. "If," he said, "intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we know anything a priori; on the other hand if the object, as object of sense, conforms to the nature of our own capacity of intuition, I can very well conceive such a possibility."² This declaration of a revolution in thought, which was likened by Kant himself to the supersession of the Ptolemaic by the Copernican hypothesis of the revolution

¹Especially through Middendorff, Längenthal, and Krause, Froebel was also a disciple of Schleiermacher. Cf. Hanschmann, *Friedrich Froebel*. Eisenach, 1874. p. 94.

²*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Berlin, 1880. p. 19.

of the heavenly bodies, received independent confirmation from psychology and the religious consciousness. Fichte and Schelling built upon the Kantian principle a completer idealism, having in each case faults of its own, but transcending the dualism which, with a suspicion of the old Cartesian leaven, Kant had perpetuated in his system by the retention of an unknowable, mentally unconditioned, residuum of things-in-themselves. For his part Fichte, taking his departure from the *Critique of Judgment* rather than that of the Pure Reason, projected an idealism all too subjective, in which only the Ego exists. But for Fichte, since life is regarded as the reconquest, by the practical or moral Ego, of the field of self-limitation which the theoretical or knowing Ego has set about itself, and which common sense calls the objective world, and since also the process of moral reconquest implies a universal moral order, the moral order was the one true self, the infinite will, the mediator between the self and the spiritual world, and the common source of both; in a word, God.¹

To Schelling, nature was more than the self-set limit of Fichte, more than subjective, and more than moral; for surely it is needless or fantastic to morally reconquer, with Fichte, say the spots on the surface of the sun. The world had for Schelling an esthetic unity. Nature was spirit visible, spirit nature invisible. Through Krause and other channels the Absolute of Schelling, although in its final form too negative, too like a mere indifference,² and too vulnerable to the satire of Hegel,³ may have helped to reveal to Froebel the common ground and source of visible and invisible spirit in the unifying will of God.⁴ This was a culmination of the romanticist tendency of thought, which, half poetic, more than half intuitive, and all inspired as it was, is in so many cases the key to the peculiarities of Froebelian education.

The attitude of Froebel towards nature is definitely marked by the following positions: Nature is (a) spirit visible; (b) objective; (c) a unity, such that every part is utterly in harmony with every part; (d) one with the mind of man, in the sense of involving a necessary correspondence with his spirit, based upon a common foundation in the absolute spirit, or in God; (e) an harmonious system developing according to its own inner laws, and as it

¹Cf. Fichte, *Werke*. Berlin, 1845. II. p. 209.

²Cf. Schelling, *Werke*. Stuttgart und Augsburg. 1859. IV. p. 103.

³V. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Preface.

⁴Cf. *Menschen Erziehung*. hrsg. Seidel. p. 144.

were an organic whole; and finally (f) a type and symbol of the life of humanity.

1. *Nature as spirit visible.* Schelling, in reaction from the determination of nature according to Fichte as an abstract limit, held nature to be parallel to man and even larger and more real. He believed that there was no phenomenon in consciousness whose embodiment in nature he could not see. Such a doctrine may be interpreted in either of two ways. It may imply no more than the objectivity of nature, which Fichte in a way had denied. It may mean, again, that consciousness is a mere product; and no ultimate process. If this be so, man is to be interpreted from nature, rather than nature from man. But this is not the point of view of Froebel, highly though he valued the reality of nature. For him it may be said that nature at every point adumbrated spiritual relationships. Indeed, if the ethical meaning of idealism be no more mysterious than this, that it lies in seeking the explanations of things in their ideas, of lower forms in their higher possibilities, then it was a true idealism that moved Froebel, when the crux came of interpreting the given symbolic relation between consciousness and nature, to call nature the symbol, mind the reality. Herein is the philosophical basis of Froebel's symbolism, in itself not necessarily unsound, however ridiculous in a few of its applications.¹ On the principles of Froebel, the educator need not go beyond symbolism to mysticism, if he will but teach nature not in its mere externality, but in its life, beauty, spirit and meaning. There is little danger of reading spirit into nature if nature be visible spirit. The danger is only of misreading—*corruptio optimi fit pessima*. For only gradually are we differentiated from our environment, which therefore shares in our spiritual nature; and whether by the poetic process as with Wordsworth, or by school rambles as with Froebel,² the growing mind is pledged by instinct, by kinship, and by utility, to cherish in relation to it a manner of sympathetic intercourse.

2. *Nature as objective.* Although they tended to regard nature as spiritual, or organic to consciousness, neither Schelling, nor Hegel, nor Froebel desired to detract from her objectivity, her reality, or her permanence. Nature to Schelling was the "com-

¹E.g. *Der B-all ist ein Bild des All. Kindergartenwesen* (Seidel) p. 40.

²*Menschen Erziehung*, hrsg. Seidel. p. 96.

plete real side in the eternal process of subject becoming object ;” and the philosophy of nature was the “first and necessary side of philosophy itself.”¹ Froebel would have been willing to grant that nature is objectively given, but essentially as a means to conscious life, and subordinate to man, “a more beautiful ladder than Jacob’s between earth and heaven.”² An educational application by Froebel of the doctrine of the objectivity of nature is his agreement with the insistency of Pestalozzi upon things before words. Children are dejected by the inanities of a premature technical nomenclature. A text-book³ has profaned the sanctities of the kindergarten with “tender violet voices” like this:

“Do tell me,” whispered a violet bud to a violet close by, “when will I be able to show my pretty blue dress? It’s nonsense my wearing my green pinafore so long!” “If you were grown up enough to leave off your pinafore you would call your pinafore a *calyx*, and your blue dress a *corolla*. From your childish way of talking any one can see you are nothing but a baby.” “I wonder if I’ve got those little stems inside me with gold tops like you have?” went on the violet bud. The violet answered hastily, “Of course you have; but don’t call them stems—*stamens* is the right name for them. You’re absurdly childish even for your age!”

One may leave such travesties with Froebel’s patient comment that the words may wait,⁴ only adding that he had every sympathy with the word in talk, and song, and story, if it were but the symbol of power. At the same time, contrary to a prevalent impression, Froebel is distinctly for reality in education. Realising to a greater extent than Fichte, or than Herbart, that nature is real, and to a degree objective, Froebel took his material from the near at hand, developed occupations from contact with visible and tangible objects, and studied nature for what it is, as well as for what it may symbolise.

3. *The unity of nature.* Nature, which to Schelling was an Odyssey of the spirit,⁵ the spirit striving to return to its own true inwardness through the form of outwardness in which it is clad in nature, seemed to Herbart not deducible from a single principle, but to be the phenomenal manifestation of a plurality

¹Schelling, *Werke*. 1859. V. p. 324.

²*Menschen Erziehung*. hrsg. Seidel. 1883. p. 136.

³*The Kindergarten Room*. By F. A. Fistrum. Blackie and Son. 1906.

⁴*Ibid.* p. 135.

⁵*Cf.* Höffding. *History of Modern Philosophy*. II. p. 165.

of independent reals. Yet if the unity be not conceived to be such as excludes difference, if it be as it seemed to Froebel, organic, then the unity of nature is an intelligible hypothesis. It is the point of departure from which Froebel endeavors to explain mind, nature, education, life and the absolute. His opening words in the *Menschen Erziehung* read like the opening words of Krause in *Das Urbild der Menschheit*, and not unlike many expressions of Schelling. For instance: "Nature in its very essence," said Schelling,¹ "is one; there is one life in all things, and one power to be, the same regulative principle through ideas. There is no pure materiality in nature, but there is everywhere soul symbolically represented in body, with a preponderance of one or the other in phenomena. For the same reason there can be but one science in nature." Mr. Bradley and others repeat the same thing. "In reality there can be no mere physical nature. The world of physical science is not something independent, but is a mere element in one total experience."²

For Froebel as for so many of the metaphysicians of his day, the unity of the world was a consequence of its spirituality. In one sense man is a part of this unity, since his physical being is an atom in its immensity, and subject to all its laws; in another he is a higher unity, capable of making the whole-world his own, a bearer of its purposes for whom the stars fight in their courses. He is a member, yet also a whole; a part, yet all-inclusive; a *Glied-ganzes*. The desire to comprehend nature under intelligible laws is by Froebel set down to the galvanisation of this nature as a *Glied-ganzes* by the fundamental instinct common throughout the world, for each individual man, animal or plant to actualise his own potentialities. The genuine boy, says Froebel, when you show him the objects of nature, will soon ask about their higher unity and causation.³ There is a subtle distinction⁴ between the master, who controls the elusive details of experience by law, and the mere teacher who allows himself to be lost in a bewildering manifold of isolated incidents. Fragmentary study devitalises natural objects and militates against the vigor of the human mind.⁵

¹*Werke*, 1850. V. p. 325.

²*Appearance and Reality*. London, 1903. p. 283.

³*Menschen Erziehung*. p. 133.

⁴*Ibid.* p. 81.

⁵*Menschen Erziehung*. p. 133.

4. *Nature and man.* The unity of matter and mind, man and nature was for Froebel not sameness but a Divine immanent will; intuitive perhaps, shot out of a pistol maybe, but not the night in which all cows are black. It has even an empirical basis so far as evolution is empirical. The nature that is akin to man cannot be spiritless.¹ To Froebel the kinship was close, so close that the Christian, he who reads in nature her deepest sermons, is the only true naturalist.² The spirit of nature and the soul of man are one, with the common ground and source, God.³ No differentiation, it is true, appears to go deeper than between mind and matter, but none is more surely confined within the limits of a system.

The unity of man and nature, so close to the heart of poetry and romanticism, so dear to Froebel and Wordsworth, might easily lend itself to the gospel of Rousseau, *education according to nature*. Froebel seems to be at times a little too enamored of spontaneities, a trifle over-jealous of civilisation. We are prone, he says, to cover the divine source of life in all our hearts with rubbish, to dam it up with waste, to hedge it in with thorns.⁴ Not that the defect as it appears in Froebel is serious, or much more than an aspect of the emphasis that he sets on self-activity. When the idea of membership, of the *Glied-ganzes*, or of organism, prevails in Froebel, nature-worship in the Rousseau sense is quite transcended.

5. *Nature and development.* Granted that the mystical connections which Froebel postulated between the worlds of crystals, animals and vegetables will not stand the test of scientific investigation, being at best a trespass of metaphysic upon fields that are not its own, the fact remains that Froebel's intuitions of evolution have endowed his educational theory with a certain permanence and validity which otherwise it could hardly have gotten, and in virtue of which it surpasses other systems, at least in the quality of anticipating views now current. It is true that since Darwin and Wallace we have a more definite idea of the nature of the inner laws of natural development; and that Froebel's deductions are subject to empirical revision, and occasionally, as in crystallography and the psychology of language,

¹Cf. Krause, *Das Urbild der Menschheit*. Dresden, 1811, p. 7.

²*Menschen Erziehung*, p. 96.

³*Menschen Erziehung*, p. 144.

⁴*Ibid.* p. 163.

may find their appropriate rest in the wastepaper basket. But among the truths that follow from the sanity of Froebel's main positions, that is to say, that nature develops by inner laws, and that these laws have a spiritual or teleological bearing, these which follow are of validity for education. Firstly, an accurate observation of natural laws in their evolution should lead up to a logical basis for the school curriculum; and secondly, if matter be really to us concrete spirit, this logical basis should tend to be psychological also. In the gifts and occupations Froebel endeavored to perfect such a logico-psychological system. The task was well done. But, since the situation contains a progressive factor, it involves a legacy of work, and is essentially a social undertaking. Since the plays and occupations of Froebel, admirable as is their *tout ensemble*, have no right divine, since again their author pinned his faith to their felt necessity rather than authority,¹ and since they may be a little out of touch with the environment of here and now, it seems to follow that kindergartners might logically, in the light of the knowledge and the needs of later generations, reinterpret the inner laws of nature and retouch the curriculum for themselves.

6. *Nature as symbol.* If nature be spiritual, that is to say, akin to the highest level of being; if it have no pure materiality,² but be spirit somehow embodied; if man may have communion with it, and may find in it the anchor of his purest thoughts; then it may well be supposed to convey a spiritual suggestion to man. In other words, it may well have for man a meaning beyond that of its external appearance, or in short, a force of symbolism. Yet symbolism is a troublesome tool. Bridging as it does the realms of things and conceptions, should it fall wholly within the one, it becomes forced; within the other, fanciful. One never knows where to halt. The lily may have its educational value as a symbol of purity, and yet the sphere may be a failure as the embodiment of moral unity. Either of them may have a symbolic value for an adult only, just as a doll has enormous symbolic value, but only to girls between definite ages. The same object may have different symbolic values for different people. The truth seems to be that symbolism is an organon more than usually subjective. A black cat symbolises witchcraft to a superstitious

¹*Kindergartenwesen*. hrsg. Seidel. 1883. p. 283.

²Schelling, *Werke*. V. p. 325. And Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*. p. 283.

man; but, one may believe, danger and death to a mouse. The mind creates symbolic connections between things and principles, just as it imposes its laws upon phenomena, but with greater freedom. Symbolism will therefore be valid in education in so far as the children under the direction of the teacher make it so. To fulfil this condition it should be natural, unaffected, appealing to all or nearly all, and adapted to age and mental development. For a child, child symbolism; for an adult, adult symbolism. There are many illustrations in Froebel's writings of the lengths to which symbolism may innocently go. In crystals he saw mirrored the whole life of man; in mathematics the religion of the soul.¹ Nor is there any doubt that to Froebel crystals *were* a mirror of life, as mathematics "a fixed starting point and a sure guide in the study of the inner connection of the manifold of nature,"² just as to Tennyson the flower in the crannied wall was a symbol of what God and man is; but to apply such symbolism directly to education is to make the ill-grounded assumption that children will discern universals in a comparatively isolated particular as easily as a Tennyson or a Froebel, when in truth few grown men can be found to have done so.

It would not appear to be the root idea of symbolic education that is in fault, namely, that man, the microcosm, finds a type of his spirit realised in the macrocosm, nature.³ The error, if error there be, lies rather in the haste and enthusiasm with which this general symbolism is applied to incommensurable details. To such a haste, to such an enthusiasm are due Froebel's a priori theories of crystalline forms, his bizarre knack of establishing connections between words on the basis of mere sound,⁴ and his assertion that in language vowels represent the inner, unity; consonants the outer, individuality. For Froebel and extreme romanticists such connections did exist; yet they must be reckoned, because they obscure more legitimate laws and unities, not only defective but false.

Symbolic education is the principle of the Froebelian gifts and occupations, the common source of their strength and weakness. Unfortunately the psychology of the gifts is not always and on every side defensible. Holding as he did that the child mind is

¹*Menschen Erziehung.* p. 140.

²*Ibid.* p. 137.

³*Cf. Education by Development.* p. 174.

⁴*E. g. Meister and meist. Menschen Erziehung.* p. 81.

from the outset a unity, trailing universals like clouds of glory from heaven, it is not wonderful that Froebel should have developed an overconfidence in the capacity of children to appreciate the symbolisation of principles in a single concrete object. Even Herbart, who in the main regarded symbols as an obvious burden on instruction,¹ was not far from this pitfall when he advocated "marking out with bright nails on a board the typical triangles, and placing them continually within sight of the child in its cradle."² The sphere, thought Froebel, would make manifest unity, and the holding of differences in unity; the cube, while not concealing unity, would emphasise variety; motions with the ball would arouse contrast and self-distinction,³ and so forth. It is little to the purpose to offer this defence, that these philosophical meanings are for the teacher, not for the child; and that it is the fact, and not the name, of unity, difference, *etc.*, that is apprehended. For, in the first place, the symbols are educationally worthless unless their meaning is for the child; and in the second place there is no reason to believe that the mere facts of unity, difference, and other *forms* of life may be better conveyed to children from a cube and a ball than a tree and a stone. It may even be pointed out that a sphere will make manifest not all unity but little more than the unity of a sphere, the cube emphasise not all difference but little more than its own differentiations, and motions with the ball awaken contrast and self-distinction practically only in relation to the ball. Not that the generalisations, unity, differentiation, self-distinction, are valueless; but they are in the gifts inadequately grounded; just as it is one thing to hold with Tennyson that to know fully the flower in the crannied wall is to know what God and man is, and quite another to look for the data of such knowledge in the flower alone, apart from the infinity of its relationships.

With all this, the weakness of the symbolism of Froebel appears to be less than its strength. Symbolism is a law of human development, whereby the child sees in his broomstick a horse, in his bricks a palace, in all his games and plays a real life and a serious society. Plays with dolls are the natural anticipation of household life and maternity; with toy ships or soldiers, for the spirit

¹*Allgemeine Pädagogik. Päd. Schrift. I. p. 176.*

²*Ibid. p. 183.*

³*Friedrich Froebels Kindergartenwesen (Seidel). pp. 40-64.*

of the sea or war ; with other children, for social life. Where the gifts are unsatisfactory, it is less for their symbolism as such than its adult character. Thus the Mother Plays are successful because theirs is a symbolism in accordance with the child's own heart. Perhaps *romantic* better describes the child mind even than *symbolic*. Children are naïve, trustful to credulity, and fancy free, with an imagination as it were not yet blighted by the light of common day. If therefore childhood be a stage of development to be lived out as such, then songs, games and stories are a needful staple of its education. Even the just reminder that what in children seems to us poetic may be commonplace to them, that the boldness of their metaphors may be correlated with the limitation of their stock of ideas, and that the life of common day may be ultimately more reliable than the radiance of infancy, alters not the principle of full and free development at every stage, and among other stages that of a joyous and saltatory romanticism. Children bending their imagination upon the glowing future are unconscious vehicles of social ends. The mother, the teacher, is to perceive this ; and seeing, she is to fill with a divine purpose¹ the void of a boundless and formless fancy.² But symbolism has now carried us over from the philosophy of nature to a philosophy of man.

II.

1. *The primacy of mind in nature.* Implied in the educational theory of Froebel there seems to be a philosophy which may be described as an objective teleological idealism. This need not perhaps imply that nature moves to a predestined goal, whither it cannot but arrive in the appointed way and at the appointed time, wholly apart from the co-operation of man. But it may be well to define this phrase, objective teleological idealism, as it is here understood. By *idealism* is here implied that the world is through and through rational ; by *teleological*, that it is to be interpreted in the light of ends or purposes, and that explanation proceeds in a sense from the higher or more spiritual types to the lower ; and by *objective*, it is intended to convey that the real world is not a mere subjective construction by individual minds, but such as exists for an absolute spirit ; and again, from

¹Cf. *Education by Development* (International Education Series). p. 179.

²Cf. The song of the knights in the *Mother Play*.

an ethical standpoint, that there is a best as well as a good. It is a principle that has fairly stood the test of time, and the inquisition of psychology, that consciousness, mind, some form of spirit, is the constitutive principle of the universe.¹ Man lives, it is true, in a world of phenomena to which it is his duty to conform. He may not wallow naked in December snows by thinking on the summer's heat. He must turn experience to account rather than defy it. And yet, how we regard facts transforms them; so that, for instance, a thunderstorm is different to him who welcomes it and to him who fears. "For in truth these independent facts, which we have only to acknowledge, are a mere figure of speech."² These facts owe their meaning to our own interpretation. There are undiscovered stars, but they do not yet exist for us; or would not but for the fact that we have reason to be convinced of their existence. To us they cannot be facts until the human spirit shall have called them forth into the reality of experience. The metaphysical position that regards experience as given, and reason as an indispensable factor in it, is corroborated by the evidence of a psychology that affirms that the sense data—a mere touch, an impact of air waves upon the drum of the ear, a tiny flat inverted image upon the retina—can be regarded as no more than the raw material of experience, or at best only its germ. But, it may be urged, as the germ explains the tree, so may the sense-datum explain experience. But how does the germ explain the tree? What would man know about a tree, having seen naught but seeds? It is not the germ that explains the tree, but the tree which explains the germ; and it is experience which explains the data of sense, not the latter which explain experience. Likewise it is not man's ancestry which explains man. The genetic psychologist who explains man's ancestry is not explaining the humanity of to-day so much as doing the important work of interpreting primitive man and childhood in the light of the highest achievements of the present. There is in the meantime a reaction of genetic studies upon present ideals, as of knowledge of the germ upon the conception of a tree; but the understanding of the former in each case is primarily dependent upon that of the latter. Mind or spirit, it would appear then, is the constitu-

¹*Cf.* Chapter I. 1.

²*Personal Idealism.* (London, 1902.) p. 62.

tive principle of the universe, because only mind or spirit contains the principle of meaning. It is to be admitted that idealism presupposes the necessity of a value and meaning in life; presupposes even the optimism of the doctrine that the best is the true. Not whatever is, is right; but whatever is right, is true. This is evidently a restatement of teleology, or the doctrine that explanation is from ends, or values, or final causes. Explanation is from the truest that is known. If then the best be the true, one must explain nature by what one recognises as best, to wit, her higher, more spiritual levels, and especially man in his ideal aspects. One must in short discern in what ought to be the condition of what is.

2. *Self-activity or development from within.* All this is in the spirit of Froebel,¹ and is the philosophical groundwork of his method. For observe the connection. That reality is spiritual means that it is always for some consciousness, immanent or transcendent. My reality is for my consciousness; absolute reality for the absolute consciousness; Froebel would say, for God. "Pure truth is thine alone," as Lessing put it.² Clearly then, for the individual, only himself can be the constructor of his own world-view; and education, as to method, can only be the actualisation of inner potencies,³ the expedition of a real spirit, and a mode of self-activity. It is self-activity, a manner of self-differentiating unity, that sets human education on a plane of its own; for though, as Kant admitted, the sensuous consciousness of an animal is a kind of unity, it is not so for itself; whereas a man's mind is conscious unity, and preserves its continuity throughout every modification.⁴ That things are spiritual, explanation teleological, and the best the true, are positions which Froebel assumes, as when with a characteristic emphasis upon intuition, faith and feeling, he says: "All things have come from the divine Unity, from God, and have their origin in the divine Unity, in God alone. . . . All things are only through the divine effluence that lives in them. The divine effluence that lives in each thing is the essence of each thing."⁵ As this divine effluence becomes in man something autonomous, education, as its realisation, is self-development. In it the indi-

¹Cf. Chapter III. *Teleology*.

²*Eine Duplik. Werke* (Leipzig, 1897). XIII. 23, 24.

³Cf. e. g. *Kindergartenbriefe* (Wien und Leipzig, 1887). 132-3.

⁴Cf. Caird. *Critical Philosophy of Kant* (Glasgow, 1880). I. 313.

⁵*Menschen Erziehung* (Seidel). *Einleitung*. p. 3. Trans. Hailmann. pp. 1-2.

vidual fulfils purposes that are not only cosmic, but his own. For Froebel, individuality in development is real, not phenomenal only. "Rich is the life of the child growing to boyhood, but we see it not; living is his life, but we do not feel it."¹ And yet, it functions in a social, cosmic, divine whole. "In God's world, just because it is God's, something is steadily expressed, and it is an unbroken progressive development in all things."² It will be necessary to return upon the conception of education as evolution at a later stage of the present analysis. In the meantime, one of its chief implications is the importance of activity and morality.

3. *The practical or moral life.* Idealism, in the broader ethical sense in which Kant, Herbart, and Schopenhauer may be said to be idealists, is at bottom a social philosophy. For the guidance of life by conscious moral principles, which is ethical idealism, is of necessity, since moral principles are of social outgrowth and bearing, social. It is perhaps a matter of opinion whether there be a necessary logical connection between ethical and metaphysical idealism. Although not all metaphysical idealists have been ethically inclined; although Schelling for one thought rather in terms of art than morality; and although certain realists, like Herbart, have had strongly ethical sympathies; it may be urged that since only spirit or reason conveys meaning, ethical idealism, which interprets in terms of highest meanings, can only consist with a metaphysical idealism, a view of the world as in some sort spiritual or rational in its ultimate constitution.

Be this as it may, Schopenhauer, while something of a protestant against the metaphysical idealism of Fichte, is in the Fichtean and Froebelian spirit when he asserts the priority of the will. "Will is first and original; knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument belonging to the phenomenon of the will. Therefore every man is what he is through his will; and his character is original, for willing is the basis of his nature."³

For Fichte also human life was a continuous exercise of will. It was the clash of an infinite spiritual order with a finite sensuous order⁴ like Tennyson's sense at war with soul, or rather, soul at war with sense. It was primarily effort, not thought

¹*Menschen Erziehung.* p. 44.

²*Mutter und Kose-Lieder* (Seidel). p. 158. Trans. F. and E. Lord. p. 154.

³*The World as Will and Idea* (London 1883). p. 377.

⁴Fichte, *Werke*. II. p. 288. Also Adamson's *Fichte*. p. 196.

nor interest. Fichte blamed Rousseau for taking only into account the sorrows of the human race, and not its powers of self-help. His own constant exhortation was: "Act! Act! for that reason are we here."¹ For Krause also the practical or moral side of life was of supreme importance. Krause based social endeavor upon gratitude; for since the individual receives according to his capacity and opportunity of the treasures of social life, so should he thankfully lay his own offering upon the altar of mankind.² The significance of an active aspect in life, an aspect of moral endeavour rather than acceptance of what is regarded as inevitable, had been emphasised by the pathfinder, Lessing. Lessing would prefer the ever-restless impulse towards truth above the complete possession of the truth itself.³ Thus the emphasis of Froebel upon activity is wholly in the spirit of German idealism during and prior to his time. Action was for Froebel prior to all else, because it is the condition of development, which for Froebel was the law of life.

To Froebel one thing only, self-sacrifice, appeared to stand above development. Or rather, self-sacrifice appeared to be a condition of development, and even a mode of self-realisation. It is easy to illustrate this thought of Froebel from the philosophy of Hegel. For Hegel, life is a process of dying to live. By dying to desire and passion we live to morality, by dying to morality we live to institutions, by dying to institutions we live to self-realisation in the freedom of established observance.⁴ Fichte held a similar if less institutional theory. "We must," he said, "according to the figure of a sacred doctrine, first die unto the world and be born again, in order to enter the kingdom of God."⁵ And so, to the mind of Froebel, it is in education. Each stage in education dies unto the next, and is taken up into it so that it is no longer an end so much as a means. There is no turning back, and no perpetuation of a transient stage. Everything moves,⁶ and the law of education as of life is progress by effort and self-sacrifice. The world of sense which lies about and around us is therefore not to be thought of as a limit; but a means to self-realisation. So viewed, man is not its puppet.

¹*Werke* (Berlin, 1845), . 344-5.

²*Das Urbild der Menschheit*. Dresden, 1811. p. 33.

³*Eine Duplik. Werke* (Leipzig, 1897). XIII. 23-24.

⁴Hegel's *Sittlichkeit*.

⁵*Werke*, Berlin, 1845. II. p. 292.

⁶*Cf.* Lessing: *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. Werke*, Leipzig 1897. XIII. p. 434.

Believing as he does in the primacy of concrete activities, and in the essential "purposiveness of our thought and the teleological character of its methods,"¹ Froebel is almost, in emphasis, a *pragmatist*. Pragmatism, in addition to these implications, appeals to utility, or rather to workableness. It appears to involve a functional psychology; it will make no truce with the so-called "pure" thought; it spurns the doctrine of knowledge for the sake of knowledge; and it rejects ethical principles that do not seem to actually affect conduct. That Froebel inclines to a pragmatic emphasis appears to be indicated by his romantic appreciation of emotion as a factor in life and education, by his voluntaristic psychology, and his preoccupation with conduct. Perhaps, for instance, Froebel is pragmatistic in the attempt to replace the analytic processes of abstract thought by a methodology of the constructive arts. "In the cultivation of the child for creative drawing," he urges, "consists the nature of the kindergarten."² But Froebel probably did not conceive of such an opposition between theory and practice, or between philosophy and life, as perhaps the modern pragmatist tends to assume, and gallantly endeavors to heal.

The ultimate separation of theory and practice, or thought and action, is inconceivable. The pragmatist emphasises not only practice, but theory in relation to practice. The idealist emphasises the same relation, and not merely theory. Indeed, for the purposes of the present analysis, pragmatism may be regarded as one aspect of idealism. For the pragmatistic leanings of Froebel are to all appearance organically related to his idealistic philosophy of life. Human life may be viewed as an interaction of knowing and doing. From this point of view, then, it was not *mere* doing that commended itself to Froebel, so much as the socialised activity that tends to convey to the individual a spiritual mastery in both the intellectual and the practical spheres. Indeed, it seems to follow from the notion of life as an interaction, that whether it be approached from the more theoretical, or from the more practical side, is largely a matter of methodology. In this broad sense, the emphasis of Froebel upon self-activity is a principle of method; and may not be wholly inconsistent with the emphasis of Herbart upon ideas.

¹Cf. *Humanism*. F. C. S. Schiller. p. 9.

²*Kindergartenwesen* (Seidel). p. 329. /Or *Education by Development*, p. 88.

As a principle of methodology, Froebel preferred education through concrete activities to education through abstract ideas. This principle involves, firstly, the preparation for thoughts by activities; and again, the application of thoughts in activities.

Secondly, it involves a concrete treatment of song and story, which are to be such as the child may make as it were into vehicles of his own feeling. Therefore they involve, in addition to self-expression, social appreciation. Stories, where possible, are to have an outlet in action; and are to preserve the pleasurable realism of infant drama.¹

Thirdly, Froebel would emphasise the constructive arts, less with Rousseau from industrial motives, than because he perceived in the creative activities something divine, as God himself is primarily creator. "In order to understand the Creator, man must be in a position to create after him, man must himself be relatively a creator."²

Fourthly, education by doing implies at least a respect for what may be called the natural methodology of the child. "Watch, only watch, the child himself will teach you."³ Or again: "Let us learn of our children, let us hearken to the gentle admonitions of their life, and the unvoiced demands of their spirit."⁴ Only upon the surface do such expressions, frequent as they are in Froebel, imply an education according to nature, where nature means mere origin as with the genetic psychologist, mere primitivism as with Rousseau. Their real function, it may not be too much to say,⁵ is to assert a neglected factor in the education process, the ground and promise of individuality, the child with his instincts and impulses. The teacher, then, is not *just* concerned with the child's individuality, or with the needs of society alone; but rather with the process in which both the child and society function. He is neither to appear before the child as the champion of a relentless society, and its mysterious demands, clad in the terrors with which it has invested him; nor is he contrariwise to lackey the child's perfections. He is not as one set over dead materials. He is set over a living process, a process which he directs as best he can, by here a

¹Cf. *Menschen Erziehung* (Seidel), p. 106.

²From Froebel's *Essay* (Eriurt, 1821). Cf. Hanschmann, *Friedrich Froebel*. p. 170.

³*Menschen Erziehung*. p. 46.

⁴*Ibid.* p. 56.

⁵Cf. note on p. 11.

touch, there a suggestion, yonder an exercise, according to the opportunities with which his living trust may furnish him.

Fifthly, it accords with the method of activity, that a teacher need not answer every question as it arises, if he but put the child in the way to answer it for himself.¹ Felt problems are a storage battery of educational power. Indeed Froebel would suggest that they are more, as it were the leaven that leavens the whole lump. "In all instruction," he says, "we should start from an inner need of the boy." Froebel adds the charge, that we are prone to this fault, "to teach and instruct our children without having awakened the want of it, yes, after we have destroyed whatever was already in the child."² From these few corollaries of Froebel's method, then, this much at least may be taken as certain, that for him the school is no spot set apart for the learning of lessons, but an institution pregnant with social life.

4. *The reign of law.* It is implied in what has been said of the moral life, that idealism demands a reign of law, a moral order, a more than subjective standard of self-realisation. A reign of law seems implied both in ethical idealism, which sees life as guided by its idea; and by metaphysical idealism, which regards the world as constituted by spirit. For apart from law in the constitution of the world there can be neither truth nor agreement; and apart from law in the moral sphere there can be no goodness, because no standard of virtue; the choice is therefore only between law and a self-destructive scepticism, such as is prone to assume a standard of truth and right in order to prove that none exists. Froebel began and ended with the notion of law.³ In the natural world, indeed, the reign of law is sufficiently proven. But so-called natural laws have a spiritual aspect; since they exist only to a reflective being, and are indebted for their intelligibility to the impress of spiritual activities. They are valid of course for animals, but not *to* them; one can only say that they are valid *for* them *to* us. But man has made nature a realm of law to himself, though willy-nilly it would be so for himself. While law indeed reigns, he endeavours by reformatations and occasional rebellions to transmute its despotism into the endurable form of a limited monarchy. Personal

¹*Menschen Erziehung*, hrsg. Seidel. p. 55.

²*Ibid.* p. 155.

³*Cf.* Hanschmann, *Friedrich Froebel*. p. 165 and p. 168.

autonomy may be actualised to the extent of one's self-consciousness, with which comes a measure of freedom, a quantum of control, an element of responsibility, and the necessity and intelligibility of the moral sense.

According to the notion of the reign of law, though there be many forms of self-activity, many modes of self-expression, there is in general only one *right* form, only one best mode, in any given set of circumstances that may be said to have a moral bearing. This principle is perhaps the root of the social influence of idealism. The idea that guides our lives is to be the best, the right idea, so far as we can locate it; and normally such an idea is likely to be socially beneficial, because it cannot but be socially constituted. And, although Kant had established the ethics of idealism on the basis of a categorical imperative, or a call of duty needing no other justification than itself, yet, to all intents and purposes, his canons of ethics gave the reasons, the necessity for which he had repudiated, for the individual to fulfil his social duty. The individual is to act always as though he were both legislator and subject in a republic of ends. And certainly for Froebel the moral law was not merely a superposed divine injunction. Without losing its divine authority, it was for Froebel an inner law, a mode in which the divine immanence is actualised. "The exercise, the development of man as an intelligent, thinking, self-conscious being to the *pure, unimpaired manifestation of the inner law* . . . and the production of the way and means thereto, is the education of man."¹

5. *Freedom.* For Rousseau, who struck a chord to which all Europe responded, freedom was on the whole absence of fetters, and the way to it the removal of them. Be the shackles of whatever kind, whether political, ecclesiastical, or social, to the mind and to the principles of Rousseau they were unendurable. Social habits were detrimental, social institutions retrogressive, social conventions baneful, social influences uneducational. The American Declaration of Independence, the poetry of Robert Burns, the utterances of the French revolutionaries, the storm and stress movement in Germany, and in a way romanticism itself, all were more or less dominated by conceptions of freedom derived from these. Such conceptions to a degree suggest the

¹*Menschen Erziehung* (Seidel, 1883). *Einleitung*. p. 4.

fundamental fallacy that individuals and society are somehow separable. To the romanticist the individual, if he were but individual enough, was the all in all; and the genius a law unto himself. Yet there were in romanticism saving elements of sociality. Especially, romanticism emphasised that common and democratic aspect of life, feeling; and it cherished an esthetic appreciation that is often not far from sympathy. These motives, strengthened as they were in his case by a Fichtean sense of duty and by Christianity, may have sufficed to carry Froebel over from Rousseau's position to a more positive ground. For Froebel, freedom is the willing fulfilment of imperative ends that are at once divine and human.¹

It has to be admitted, not indeed that wrongdoing is or can be freedom, but that freedom involves the possibility of wrongdoing. Children may be so shielded, every burden of responsibility so assumed for them by parents, that never having truly willed they lose the normal capacity for willing. They submit themselves to an external authority without the opportunity of identifying themselves with it, or making it their own; and here is illustrated Rousseau's contribution to a true notion of freedom, that it is too much to expect a rational being to manifest slavish obedience to laws regarded as externally imposed. Fichte even adds that the law should say to the student: "So far as I am concerned, thou mayest leave the path of right and follow after evil, no other harm shall overtake thee but to be despised and scorned, despised even by thyself when thou turnest thine eye inward. If thou wilt venture on this peril, venture on it without fear."²

Even when the doctrine of implicit obedience, which has been a pretext for the ready and easy way of corporal punishment, has been rejected, the educator is still in a dilemma, to escape which he must make up his mind upon the question of the freedom of the will. If the will be in some sort free, then one should develop it with Froebel; but if not, then one may try to build it up, with Herbart, by deliberate presentations.

On the one hand every man has a consciousness of freedom. He determines to do a thing, and he does it. Evidence of this kind is as abundant, and perhaps as valid, as the contrary evi-

¹Cf. e. g. *Mutter und Kose-Lieder. Schlusslied.*

²*Werke.* Berlin, 1845. VI. p. 409. or *Popular Works.* London, 1873. p. 193.

dence for the "inertia of matter."¹ It would seem to be the case that man *may* drift along as flotsam and jetsam idly tossed on the surface of a sea of being; but that he is free to the extent to which he *uses* his freedom. His potential freedom, as such, is a vain thing; made kinetic, it is the dearest treasure of his inheritance.

Freedom was for Kant and Fichte transcendental, capable of giving a veto to the whole world of sense and the desires originating out of it. To this view Herbart found himself unable to subscribe.² Given certain circumstances, it seemed to him that a man must act in a particular way. Between these views the truth may lie. Perhaps given certain circumstances *and a certain character* a man will act in a particular way, but what of the play of self-determination in the formation of the character itself? The character also, says the determinist, is determined by past combinations of circumstances. Still, in each act that made the character there was from the beginning a reaction of mind in its own way. To account for the origin of mental reactions the determinist refers to heredity. Even this can only mean that until the child becomes self-conscious he is determined, as an animal is determined. To this argument the rejoinder is, that even an animal has an inner principle of independence; and that, with self-consciousness, there is given the possibility of emancipation in the power of setting up ideals. It is not perhaps in the purely transcendental sense, the Kantian sense of sheer independence, that man is free, so much as by progressive achievement. According to this view, there is in man a capacity, or the germ of a capacity, for transcending the fierce compulsions of external nature. If not free, man is in process of becoming free, and as such by no means a slave.

One of the arguments for free will is that morality presupposes the possibility of achieving it. In Kant's phrase, thou canst because thou oughtest. What *ought* is not consequent on what *is*, but what is upon what ought. Morality thus bears its own warrant; it is autonomous. "Whatever number of motives nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses—the moral ought it is beyond their power to produce."³ Moral con-

¹Cf. Gibson, *The Problem of Freedom*. In *Personal Idealism*. London, 1902. pp. 139-192.

²*Pädagogische Schriften*. hrsg. Sallwürk. 1891. II. p. 203.

³*Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Berlin, 1889). pp. 446-447.

trol is therefore self-control. Freedom, the ideal freedom after which man struggles, is self-limited only; though in dealing with his fellows, as Fichte suggests, the voice of conscience utters the command: "Here set a limit to thy freedom; here recognise and reverence purposes which are not thine own."

It was Hegel who got furthest away from the notion of freedom which was implied in Rousseau's doctrine of the relation of the individual to society. For Rousseau, freedom appears to have consisted fundamentally in the absence of institutional control. But Hegel conceived the principle of freedom by institutions. For Hegel, man rises not so much in spite of his limitations as by them. Those limits of which at times he complains, his body and the world of sense, are the means of actualising his capacity for freedom. The world of nature which constrains him becomes by degrees his servant. Krause had claimed that finitude is no evil, limitation not an imperfection; and that it is just in order that men may participate with individuality in the being and all-perfectness of God, that they come to exist in determinate form, bound, and limitation.¹ In the same spirit, though in the field of poetry, Browning would have the bodies of men to be none other than they are, organs for the fulfilment of natural destinies, perverted by no "mad wings." And if the body be the vehicle rather than the fetter of the mind, in just the same way, from this point of view, are institutions not the limits of freedom so much as the means of realising it. Institutions transmit to individuals a certain social control over experience. Indeed, we realise ourselves not in so far as we are not interfered with by family, school, church or state, but in so far as we endeavor to utilise these and other institutions for the moral reconquest of nature. Froebel was fully of opinion that man becomes free by the elevation of physical necessity into moral law,² and he is so far, as it were, Hegelian and institutional, rather than a mere advocate of spontaneities.

In the few cases, indeed, where Froebel appears to be no more than a disciple of Rousseau, and to think of spontaneities as freedom,³ all that he means may be that law is not something alien or external to man. Froebel believed in law as an inner thing, an element in man that is primary and divine, a repro-

¹*Das Urbild der Menschheit* (Dresden, 1811), p. 6.

²*Cf. Schlusslied*, and Hanschmann, *Friedrich Froebel*, pp. 165-8.

³*E. g. Menschen Erziehung*, p. 46, p. 56, and p. 152.

duction in some way, or an emanation, of the absolute spirit, and therefore such as finds its other self in nature, and recognises truth and satisfaction there. And if law does exist, though it be inner, the will is not as it would seem out of the reach of education, just as though it obeyed no law at all. According to this conception, though the will be viewed, as many prefer to view it, as a divine endowment, it may remain subject to development by use, or atrophy by neglect. It may even be advanced that, holding such a view, Froebel may be said to have met, not wholly without success, the challenge of Herbart: "We may hope that the first transcendental philosopher who is interested in education may be able to show for it an appropriate basis."¹ For it had not unnaturally seemed to Herbart, that if the will were purely transcendental, having its kingdom where time and space are not, utterly superior to circumstance, it could not be amenable to education. This objection only ceases to apply, if the will be *becoming* transcendental, if its very transcendentalism be less a gift than a discipline, so that its doors lie ever open to the influence of the occasion.

Of the consequences of the principle of freedom for education, one of the first is respect for individuality. "We have nothing else to do but to let live the individual nature of the child, and to carefully remove whatever might involve its destruction."² Perhaps a prerequisite for this attitude is faith in the possibilities of man as man, possibilities human, social, and as Froebel would add, divine.

A somewhat democratic tone in the school seems to be another implication of the doctrine of freedom. Froebel's ideas and those of democracy have as it were a common basis, in that they rest upon the conception, which is the debt of both to Rousseau, of the worth of man as such, or if you will of the sacredness of individuality. And if their ethical basis be thus identical, so also is the logic of their method, which may be said to depend upon the principle that the development of a power can only be secured by using it. The child has to exercise determinations, though he make mistakes in so doing; and the voter needs the opportunity to vote, and claims it, imperfect though his judg-

¹*Pädagogische Schriften* (Sallwürk, 1891). II. p. 203.

²*Menschen Erziehung* (Seidel). p. 152.

ment may be, that he may learn in its exercise to use it to the best advantage.

A third implication of freedom is perhaps, in the light of the previous discussion, pragmatically truest of all for education. It is exercise in the voluntary discharge of obligations. For there is little manner of doubt as to the kind of individual to be developed. He is to be the socialised individual, the functioning individual, the individual whose point of view is not that of a self located in the body alone, but of a corporate situation; and especially he is to be all this not by virtue of an external compulsion, but by free choice and a good will nourished by the assimilation of many opportunities. And so the boy is to be trained to take up his future calling, not in gloom and compulsion, but rejoicing in its prosperity, and securing in the circle of his activity, contentment.¹

Fourthly, freedom in the school lends itself to national influences. In Prussia, kindergartens were suppressed by a reactionary government in 1851 on the ground that they expressed revolutionary tendencies. And, although it is true that an element of misunderstanding had entered into the edict, to a certain extent kindergartners may be justified in looking back at the occurrence with pride. From their standpoint of contemporary security, they may be entitled to regard it as an admission of a genuine democratic principle in the kindergarten. The government of Prussia objected to enthusiasm, objected to freedom of development, and preferred methods of authoritative tutelage to principles of self-activity. What has the spirit of autocracy in common with the burning words of one of Froebel's manifestoes? "Now, therefore, we hereby invite all German wives and maidens to unite with right German enthusiasm in founding and developing a *General Institution for the complete culture of child life up to school age*. We claim their help, in a genuine German spirit, in one common effort to found and develop the German *Kindergarten*."² Indeed, any appeal to the democratic element of social feeling is apt to have a national and political bearing.

Fifthly, freedom in education seems to mean that instincts and impulses are to be utilised, not eliminated. For these are the obvious contributions of the self to the educative process.

¹*Menschen Erziehung* (Seidel). pp. 163-4.

²*Friedrich Froebels Kindergarten-Briefe* (Wien und Leipzig 1887). pp. 132-3. Translated N. Y. 1896.

If they be not respected, or in some way maintained, it is difficult to see how there should be talk of freedom. Yet it is one thing to respect instincts and impulses, and another to admire them as they blindly perform an unassisted work. But, if freedom may be defined in terms of the realisation of an inner principle, so that it nowise contradicts law, but harmonises with it in the principle of development; then instincts and impulses may be thought of not as the opposites to ends, ideals or values, so much as the possibilities and cravings for these very realisations and satisfactions.¹ The educational situation ought then to be, not impulses *versus* the curriculum, but impulses for it. And, if freedom be definable as self-control, or even the control of the experiential process in which the self is a terminal factor, it will be even possible to speak of educating impulses to freedom.

Sixthly, so far as this point may be differentiated from the last, the notion of a psychological method seems bound up with the principle of freedom. Psychology is developing a genetic tendency to look trustfully to original instincts and impulses, and to let them have free sway. If one may be permitted to set up a temporary methodological distinction between the curriculum and method of the school, as it were between social demand and individual channels of supply, then the method of the school tends to recognise freedom by catering to individual impulses and modes of agency.

Again, since freedom has nothing in common with force or fear, it means finally that in the schoolroom *love* is to preside. It is a message of Froebel to teachers that the great formative influence is love. Love never violates the sanctities of freedom, has no machine methods, scorns the mere equipoise of intellect without emotion, discloses personality, and imparts that vital touch of the divine which is all that is needed to sound the strings of the harp of character. This is why Froebel's message is principally to women, in whose hands the destiny of nations is said to lie. "The minors must come of age in our time, and they are above all the women and children, whose human worth has hitherto not been recognised in full measure."² The love of Froebel for humanity as such was founded upon his religious views, and his faith in the Absolute Spirit.

¹Cf. *Menschen Erziehung* (Seidel), p. 4, p. 152, etc.

²*Erinnerungen an Friedrich Froebel*. Bülow. Kassel 1876. p. 4. Said to be Froebel's words.

III.

German Idealism led up to an Absolute which was somewhat differently conceived by the founders of various philosophical systems, although the differences may have been more in emphasis than perhaps in essence. All the founders of systems were agreed that the Absolute was spiritual, that is to say on the highest level of being; that it was self-conditioning, and contained in itself the principle of its own explanation; and that it was constitutive of life and nature, and manifested in them. For Schelling the Absolute was a ground of Identity¹ of mind and things, an almost esthetic unity. For Fichte it was rather an universal Moral Order,² for Hegel unifying Will or personality,³ and for Froebel the Christian God, regarded as there is reason to believe theistically, rather than pantheistically as was alleged against him in his lifetime.⁴

1. *God, as absolute ground of all things.* For Froebel, God, up to whom Idealism may be said to lead by no uncertain path,⁵ is the absolute ground of all things.⁶ Idealistic philosophy used the phrase, *the Absolute*, to express the unconditionally real spirit. The Absolute is often identified with God, although there are those who would with some show of reason include in the Absolute all spiritual individualities; while others prefer to regard the absolute spirit not as perfected, so much as working itself out in the processes of the natural world. Possibly, in as much as the term *Absolute* seems so liable to a diversity of interpretations, it may be preferable, at least in relation to an educational issue, to substitute for it the name of God.

From Kant to Hegel there is a development in the appreciation of things divine. Kant's conception of God was largely *deistic* or dualistic. In other words, it would seem that for his metaphysic, in which right and good were autonomous,⁷ God was somewhat externally postulated. But for Fichte, God may perhaps have stood in a closer relation to humanity, at least if any reliance is to be placed on the terms Moral Order, consti-

¹Cf. e. g. *Werke*. Stuttgart und Augsburg. 1859. IV. p. 103.

²Cf. e. g. *Werke*. Berlin, 1845. II. p. 299.

³Cf. Caird's *Hegel*. pp. 127-8.

⁴*Erinnerungen an Friedrich Froebel*. Bülow. Kassel, 1876. p. 4.

⁵Cf. Wallace, *Kant*. Edinburgh and London, 1886. pp. 120, 189.

⁶Cf. *Menschen Erziehung*. Opening paragraphs.

⁷Cf. MacVannel, *Educational Theories of Herbart and Froebel*. 1905. p. 85. In *Teachers College Contributions to Education*.

tutive and combining Energy, the only true Self,¹ the Will that "binds me in union with himself," that "also binds me in union with all finite beings like myself, and to the common mediator between us all."² The Romanticists thought of God often as the great artist, indwelling or *immanent* in his work. Possibly even this view may have a certain suggestiveness when set over against a dualistic deism that opposes God to nature. If so, Schelling's pantheism may be more than a system of perversions. Certainly, at every point it influences Froebel, above all in the notion of the unity of nature, and of God as the bond of unity.³ And yet, in Froebel there seem to be suggestions of the divine transcendence as well as immanence; as though in his heart he were seeking a theistic synthesis, or a transcendental-immanent reconciliation of his pantheistic leanings with the Hegelian notion that the Absolute is not substance but subject. For Hegel, God was not so much an immanent Feeling, as for Schelling; but much more Will, a Man of war, a Spirit that is not only unity, but unity holding in itself all differences, and for ever active in their interpretation.⁴

Many have thought that Froebel failed to sufficiently discriminate his philosophy, religion, and education. Perhaps what at first sight seems to be confusion may reward the careful student by manifesting itself as an efficient harmony. Doubtless Froebel's bias was mystic, probably his syntheses were at times based on inadequate analyses; but of what constructive mind can this not be said, and is the word *confusion* applicable? At any rate it seems doubtful whether a few critical defects should be allowed to obscure the vigour and efficiency that are the fruits of a unitary organisation of the attitudes of the soul. In other words, Froebel may have been a better educator because he knew how to harmonise his philosophy and his religion. And therefore, if the comparison may be made without odium, to whatever extent Froebel may have been weaker than Herbart on the side of the critical reason, it was much that he should have been the stronger in faith, feeling and intuition. Critically, philosophy and religion may lie far asunder; vitally they can-

¹Cf. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Boston, 1892. p. 162.

²*Sämmtliche Werke*. Berlin, 1845. II p. 209.

³"This Unity is God." See opening paragraphs of the *Education of Man*.

⁴Compare the conclusion of *Hegel's Logic*. Harris. Chicago, 1890.

not. Philosophy, says Hegel, only unfolds itself while it unfolds religion; and while unfolding itself it unfolds religion.

Froebel's system of education was all bound up with religion. True, he had little concern with the problem of teaching children of diverse religious denominations, although few educators, perhaps, have passed through more bitter experiences of sectarian rancour. Yet this modern problem, delicate as it is, seems to have only an indirect bearing upon Froebel's thesis that religion should pervade the school curriculum; nay, that it should begin at the mother's knee. Meaning by religion anything but dogma, Froebel entertained no fear that it might unduly perplex even the youngest child. On the contrary, he maintained, it is because we do not instruct on inner things that they might understand, but only on outer things that they do not understand, that the life and soul of older boys tend to be as empty as they are.¹ "Inner" things seem to mean things after which the soul hungers, among them the love and the will of God. Rousseau would have kept Emile for many years ignorant of God's name. But for Froebel it was the task of instruction, in his own words, "to bring into the consciousness of the scholar the unity of all things and the repose, being and life of all things in God, so that in time he may be able to act according to this consciousness."²

2. *Pantheism*. Possibly for the purposes of the present analysis almost enough has already been said about the pantheistic leanings of Froebel.³ He did not consider himself to be a pantheist.⁴ It may none the less be true that in these matters the individual is not his own best critic, and that Froebel's categorical repudiation of the tenet avails little in a dispassionate analysis of his creed. And yet perhaps it may serve, in conjunction with the tenor of his teaching, to indicate that if his faith may have been pantheistic, it was not with the attenuated pantheism that society holds in reproach. Froebel may have been pantheistic to the extent of an ample breadth of realisation of the divine immanence in nature, without sacrificing much of the intensity of the Christian notion of a personal God. He may have seen no more reason against a combined immanence and transcendence in the deity than in the nature of the human consciousness. If

¹*Menschen Erziehung* (Seidel 1883). pp. 169-70.

²*Ibid.* p. 80.

³See preceding section.

⁴*Erinnerungen an Friedrich Froebel*. Bülow. Kassel, 1876. pp. 28-9.

this were so, perhaps he may have had the right to emphasise immanence or transcendence at will. If it be possible to arrive at a narrower definition, it is not improbably this; that when Froebel thinks of humanity, God appeals to him rather as transcendent but sympathetic spirit; and when he thinks of nature, then God appeals to him chiefly as immanent spirit. It is in somewhat different terms that Froebel himself is reported to have repudiated the doctrine of pantheism. Pantheism, said he, practically views the world as God's body. Personally he disclaimed such an opinion. God is not in the world, he maintained, but the world is in God.¹ In a word, Froebel's position was that which Krause used to call *panentheism*. That the world is somehow in God does not seem gravely unorthodox; it may be a sort of reconciliation between pantheism and transcendentalism; and if it be an essentially pantheistic position, it is also more than pantheistic.

So fundamental is the notion of the divine immanence to Froebel's thought, and so vital to his educational theory, that it would have to be treated at much greater length had not this been already done in the section upon Froebel's theory of nature. But, as the case stands, it may suffice to recall by mere phrases certain educational implications to which attention has already been given. Perhaps these are especially (a) the cultivation of a human sympathy with nature, (b) the recognition of the unity of her processes in all her kingdoms, (c) the subjection of nature to spiritual laws, and all that this involves for conduct and method, and (d) the partial justification of an emphasis upon universal laws, even in the kindergarten. Perhaps only the last of these points demands a more specific explanation. A divine immanence means at least that all things are related; that the Absolute, the whole, is somehow involved in every part; and that consequently there may be a certain philosophic basis for symbolism in education.

3. *Teleology*. Froebel's theory of the divine element in education, broadly viewed, presents another aspect for discussion, that of teleology. Teleology, perhaps, may fairly be identified with ethical idealism, and again with the Aristotelian conception of final cause.² In a way it is the supreme factor in ideal-

¹*Erinnerungen, etc.*, p. 28 as above.

²Aristotle, *Physics*. Books I and II. *Metaphysics*, I. iii. 1.

ism, because of the bond which it establishes between the ideal and the real, between realised and struggling spirit, between the divine and human, between Plato's pattern laid up in heaven and the Aristotelian process of becoming on earth. Teleology ventures to affirm that it is only the end which can explain the process that moves toward it; and that true cause is not so much the sum of pre-existing necessary and sufficient conditions as the purpose or end which calls forth the whole process. According to Idealism one may even expect a necessary connection between the notions of efficient or scientific, and final or teleological, cause. For the efficient cause of any change, which is the sum of all the relevant pre-existing conditions, seems ultimately to become indistinguishable from the constitution of the universe at large. How many thousand factors in the universe enter into the constitution of man? But if then the universe be structurally the efficient cause, so also must it not be the effect? It would seem to follow, as the doctrine of the conservation of energy more clearly indicates, that true change is less in matter than in meaning. But the notion that change, or if one may put upon the word change an optimistic interpretation, *progress*, is a growth in fulness of meaning, would appear to imply that explanations should come rather from ends than origins, simply because the ends or realisations manifest the major significance. And this again is teleology. The stuff, as possibility, remains; but progress is through new forms, ideas, meanings and relations.¹ Teleology perhaps implies the postulate of healthy optimism, that the best is the true. It will decline to interpret man by the brute that he may have sprung from, preferring to interpret the brute by a supplementary reflux of light from man. It will affirm that Rousseau was mistaken in his appeal to nature in the sense of origin, because man is more true, more real, more valid than nature, in the sense that he is relatively her most significant realisation. As against all appeals to primitivism, teleology involves an unequivocal faith in progress and a dynamic theory of life.² God, said Froebel, has not

¹Cf. Bosanquet's characterisation of cause as "change in the permanent," in the concluding chapter of his "*Essentials of Logic*."

²Expressed by Schiller in his poem, *Hoffnung*:

"Es ist kein leerer, schmeichelnder Wahn,
Erzeugt im Gehirne des Thoren,
Im Herzen kündet es laut sich an:
Zu was Besserm sind wir geboren;
Und was die innere Stimme spricht,
Das tauscht die hoffende Seele nicht."

placed man on the narrow path of imitation, but on the broad road of development.¹ It may fairly be admitted that Froebel's theory of development is teleological throughout, both because, on the one hand, he is confident that the free unfolding of the activities of the self will *tend* to the realisation of ideal or divine purposes; and also for this further reason, that he finds in these purposes a standard for the interpretation of the education process. Education aims at bringing the soul into conscious harmony with the development in which it functions and lives. The well-educated man, it might be submitted, is literally the man who has entered as a conscious determining agent, or as a free co-operative partner, into this development; who has in a sense taken over his own evolution, and achieved personal freedom along with the recognition of personal responsibilities. Morality, as the endeavour to transform the *is* into the *ought*, may possibly be described as the practice of teleology. Theoretically according to teleology, practically according to morality, the end to which all things are relative is a spiritual, divine nature, consciously achieved and realised.² According to the doctrine of teleology, men as self-conscious beings are no longer merely impelled from behind, but also attracted from before; and even though their ideals may be in a sense the products of a past, this is made possible because their past itself stood in an organic relation to spirit, and is only explicable in the light of a present and future.

Teleology is almost in itself a philosophy of education. It connects, as education must, two terminal aspects of a unitary process. It indicates a vital relation between possibilities and realisations, between powers and values, between instincts and thoughts, between impulses and freedom. It shows dimly, perhaps, but still it shows, what the child is to man, what man to the child. As an aspect of evolution, it seems to reconcile the Pestalozzian standard of the development of given powers with more obviously social and vicarious ends. But teleology is not only the condition of the possibility of education; it is also a ground of the activity of the teacher in the educative process. One may none the less freely grant a sense in which education is passive, following, because the natural impulses of the child,

¹*Menschen Erziehung*, hrsg. Seidel. 1883. p. 11.

²*Menschen Erziehung*, hrsg. Seidel. 1883. p. 23.

possibly by their pre-natal education in the race and in the species, clamor on the whole for social satisfactions, and are only wayward in their marginal vagaries. And yet the principal message of teleology to education is to be positive. If consciousness have any pragmatic validity, any *use*, if it be more than a mere "epiphenomenon;" then the teacher, representing the social consciousness, will have to interfere and keep on interfering relatively to a consciously conceived end. To the realisation of this end everything else, even development, is subordinate. Thus a teleological theory of education, to be rational, may be said to subordinate and subject development itself to the idea of development. This is precisely what Froebel would do in his attempt to make family education *conscious*; and to raise it from the level of an instinctive process to that of scientific method.

Indeed, the moment reflection comes into play, to make development itself the end is meaningless. For the question is at once asked, what is this development that is made the end, and the answer is necessarily in terms of an idea of it. Man cannot well escape from the use of his reason; he must think, and in thinking set up a standard of what he conceives the true nature of development to be. This is as true for a metaphysical realist like Herbart as for a metaphysical idealist like Froebel. Ethically, Herbart is perhaps as good an idealist as Froebel, in aiming as he does at a many sided interest and a good will. But there are those who find a greater discrepancy between the metaphysical and ethical positions of Herbart than those of Froebel. For Froebel the origin is God, and the end God; so that for him the whole process of life has a spiritual, and one may almost say a religious, character. For Herbart the origin is independent reality, and the end phenomenal morality—a difficult transition.

The final word in this preliminary interpretation of Froebel is that his central thought was guidance. Sometimes he seems to say with Rousseau, *follow nature*; sometimes with Hegel, *control nature*. "Follow nature" means with Froebel not only to foreswear force and to remove hindrances; it means also that there is a positive social and "divine" tendency in instincts and impulses themselves. "Control nature" means that this mere tendency to the good is to be consciously cherished, guided, and improved. To follow nature is as it were to look at education from the side of origin, or genetically. But Froebel saw values

too, and set them above origins. "Without rational, conscious guidance," he is reported to have said, "the activity of the child degenerates into idle games (*Spielerei*), instead of preparing for the tasks of life unto which it is destined."¹

It would almost seem from the above analysis that, since Froebel, we have not so much to add to his teaching, or even to correct it, as to evolve from it a completed philosophy of education. Yet there is perhaps in his teaching at times an ambiguity, at times a hyper-symbolism, at times an imperfection. The way to escape the dangers of these and the like faults, which are in general rather tendencies than faults properly so called, is to study another philosophy of education, the philosophy of Herbart. This will be found to be largely antithetic to Froebel's, and yet in such a way that the two philosophies are to a large extent the complements of one another.

Before turning to Herbart, one may perhaps pay a final tribute to Froebel's contribution to a philosophy of education. His chief ideas, of self-activity as the force operative in education, of development as the process of education, of freedom as the path of education, and duty or service as the standard of values for education, these have all stood the test of time unchanged except in their development to a richer concreteness. Accordingly it is difficult for an idealist to read Froebel without feeling himself to be fundamentally a Froebelian. Let his philosophy savour as it will of eclecticism from Kant, Schelling, Fichte and Krause, let his practical recommendations fall short as they must of the counsel of perfection, still it is impossible not to perceive a fundamental unity in his philosophy and a fundamental truth in his practice. His voice is the voice of a prophet and a reformer. His theory may be said to center about that maxim of idealism, or rather if you will of teleology, *the best is the true*, as his practice lives in his own motto, *Come let us live for our children*.

¹*Erinnerungen an Friedrich Froebel*. Bülow. Kassel, 1876. p. 45.

CHAPTER II.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERBART.

It may be said of Herbart that, unlike Froebel, he stepped out of the line of development from Kant to Hegel in order to fashion a link in another and a divergent chain. For it is possible to distinguish two modes of the post-Kantian philosophical development. The idealism of Kant was developed by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; and his realism by Herbart, Beneke, and Lotze. It may be indicated how logical and perhaps inevitable this bifurcation was. To go back to the beginning, Kant had discovered a new mode of approach to the fundamental problem of reality. Instead of accepting the external or sensational as the basis of the interpretation of mind, he preferred as it were to reverse the problem; and, beginning with mind, to inquire how its a priori activities may be possible. He found that sensation can do no more than to furnish the raw material of thought, upon which in all knowledge the mind has to impose a contribution of its own. In this way, so far as the world of conceptions goes, Kant became an idealist. At the same time, he regarded his analysis as valid only for thought, and not for things as such. In this distinction lay the germ of a dualism which idealists have ever since endeavoured to transcend and realists to make intelligible. There are those who would not think it unfair to maintain that in spirit Kant was an idealist, and only by reservation a realist. Others, among whom must be reckoned Herbart, held that the Kantian dualism between the real and the rational is fundamental and metaphysically irreducible. Ultimate reality consists for this school in a plurality of independent reals, unknowable, because other than the phenomena registered or capable of being registered by consciousness. To this position Herbart stood faithful, unable to subscribe to the idealistic construction which Fichte based upon Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. "In one word," as Herbart declares in the preface to his *Allgemeine Metaphysik*, "the author is a Kantian . . . if however of the year 1828, and not of the times of the *Categories* and the *Critique of Judgment*, as the diligent reader will soon observe."¹

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Königsberg, 1828. Vorrede, pp. xxvi.—xxviii.

The realism of Herbart has nothing in common with materialism. The reals, the things-in-themselves, that for Herbart underlie the phenomenal world, may even be psychically interpreted; Herbart leaves this indeterminate. Certainly Herbart — is ethically an idealist, if idealism, ethically interpreted, mean the guidance of life by an idea. Further, even in the more ontological sense, Herbart is perhaps not wholly debarred by his realism from accepting spirit as a constitutive principle in the universe. For to Herbart as to Kant, time and space are subjectively determined rather than externally given. Again, Herbart's reals, whether psychic or no, can by no means be materially conceived. Matter to Herbart is mere appearance; and the reals behind it are according to Herbart's whole argument something heterogeneous to it, its unknown noumenal origin. The realist is then so far from being the materialist that he does not even hold matter to be real. In a sense only the idealist is a true believer in its reality. To put the matter in another way, the metaphysical question between idealism and realism may be said to center about the word *merely*, as employed in the following context. To the realist, the world as known is *merely* appearance. To the idealist also it is appearance; but not appearance *merely*, because to the idealist in a sense there is nothing else, save appearance and its potentiality. For idealism reality is nothing save as related to some consciousness; and again, if anything does appear to any consciousness, it must have reality in some way and to some degree. For a realist a thing is flatly real or not real, for an idealist it is real to the extent of its relations, for a pragmatist it is real to the extent of its functions. An idealist would say that the fact that the existence of the world, for a thinking subject, can only be explained on the basis of the rationality of nature, is not to be interpreted as making the world unreal, but as making its reality conceivable. The world that is *mere* appearance to Herbart is to Froebel *real* appearance.

This characterisation of the realism of Herbart, in contrast with the idealism of Froebel, is merely introductory. In the present chapter, the attempt will be made to treat, firstly, the philosophical relations of Herbart; secondly, the principles of his metaphysic; and thirdly, the foundations and the fundamental implications of the Herbartian psychology.

I.

1. *Herbart and Leibnitz.* In the *Allgemeine Metaphysik*, Herbart begins with the remark that if he were looking for a stately entrance to the realm of metaphysical speculation, he could find it nowhere more conveniently given than in the philosophy of Leibnitz. For to Leibnitz the world was a thoroughly inter-related whole, endlessly extended, without empty space, and in every smallest part infinitely full of monads or individual real existences. It may be held therefore to consist of an infinite number of real parts, each monad among which is possessed of an incessant activity, so that according to Leibnitz no substance can be perfectly at rest, and no soul utterly dormant. A kind of perception and striving goes on, even in unreasoning monads or reals. For Leibnitz, again, each monad has a capacity for reproducing the whole in detail. Each monad is in fact a mirror of the world, conformably to its own status. And yet, with all this fulness and greatness, the real world is not regarded as exhausting the law of possibilities. God chose it, thought Leibnitz, as the best of all possible worlds. By a single undivided and indivisible fiat, He raised it into reality out of the realm of potentialities. This metaphysic has the merits of completeness and suggestiveness; and, as Herbart remarks with a touch of mild satire, there remained for the school of Leibnitz only one arduous task, such a doctrine—to prove.

Herbart considered that the school of Leibnitz had by no means succeeded in establishing the principles of the *Monadology*. Even Kant's reform did not satisfy him, much less the culmination of that reform in the idealism of Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling. All this was to Herbart as it were a period of storm and exhaustion, duly to be followed by renewed efforts at rehabilitation. One such effort he himself inaugurated. He believed that in the rehabilitation, or reconstruction, of philosophy, monads might well reappear, but hardly following the method or views of Leibnitz. Rather must the monads be reinterpreted in the light of the "spiritualism"¹ of the newer² psychology and the atomism of the newer² chemistry. Herbart adds that contemporary idealism has served its purpose as the embodiment of a

¹*Der Spiritualismus.*

²*i. e.* in 1828.

method of transition to clearer insight.¹ Possibly this may be granted, and yet there may be no unanimity as to what constitutes the clearer insight; whether Herbart's solution, or that of Hegel.

2. *Ethical views.* It was Herbart's contention that the older metaphysic, for want of determinate bound and form, had surrendered to the comparatively external influences of the empirical detail of psychology, and the science of esthetics, "especially its most important part, ethics."² Ethics, as belonging to the world of appearance, had for Herbart no metaphysical validity, except in the looser sense in which the esthetic judgment may be called metaphysical. On the other hand with Fichte and Froebel, and in a sense Kant, ethics is fundamental to metaphysics, in that Fichte, Kant and Froebel explain and warrant that which is only by that which ought to be.

Severing as he did the ethical from the metaphysical, Herbart could not consider the freedom of the will a strictly metaphysical problem, with the idealist. For Herbart, to attribute freedom or servitude to the will is a purely esthetic judgment; and to hold it to be more than this is to fall into the error of regarding the esthetic judgment, which concerns only the will, as if it indicated also the hidden ground of the will, with which it really has nothing to do. Herbart illustrated this so-called confusion from the controversy of Leibnitz and Clarke. Leibnitz said: "A will without motive is like the chance of Epicurus, a contradictory fiction, incompatible with the idea of will." Clarke replied: "The principle of action is quite separate from the motive." Herbart acutely pointed out that to deny motivation is to abolish the standard of moral worth, because the morality of an action could no longer be determined by the difference between good and evil.³ Again, Clarke insisted that nothing is worthy the name of action unless it may have proceeded from a power that was also a power *not* to act. To this Leibnitz responded that the mind that sets the weaker desire above the stronger is acting against itself. If Herbart inclines to one side or the other in this discussion, it is probably to the side of Leibnitz; but it is his feeling that Leibnitz and Clarke alike have failed to distinguish between the will itself, as esthetic judgment,

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 25.

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 30.

³*Ibid.* Par. 31.

and its ultimate metaphysical ground. Herbart grants the will as it were an esthetic freedom, of the nature of a harmony between desire and satisfaction, but this freedom is for him nothing transcendental, nothing metaphysical, nothing real. The relation of will to motive, which Leibnitz and Clarke disputed, was not a real problem to Herbart. *His ethical problem was merely the relation of will to judgment.*

To Froebel, on the contrary, morality and freedom were real metaphysical problems centering about the question of motivation. It may seem hardly fair to set Froebel, with his mere intuition, backed by a philosophical reading and training inferior to Herbart's, although not to be despised, over against one of the keenest and subtlest of metaphysicians in a discussion concerning freedom. Indeed it is not fair unless Froebel be sympathetically interpreted. This done, Froebel seems to say: yes, the will is motivated, but because it makes the motive its own through self-identification with one of its desires, one may say that it is free just because it is motivated. It is ruled in a way by desires, but the desires are also its own. It is impelled in a way by circumstances, but these circumstances are so far from external that in the process of being converted by the self from apparent masters to real servants they become instrumental to self-realisation.

3. *The relation of Herbart to Kant.* "The possible indicates the idea, but the real indicates the object and its position."¹ This was the distinction by which, according to Herbart, Kant succeeded in effecting a revolution in metaphysic. In denying that the idea *is* the reality, Kant became the founder of modern realism, just as he is the founder of modern idealism by virtue of his demonstration that the idea is the real *for us*. Kant had held that the idea is the same, whether of a hundred real dollars or a hundred possible dollars, and yet the reality is different. An idealist might deny that the idea is the same; but from this distinction, such as it is, Herbart takes his departure. He believed it to involve a true theory of reality. But how, he asks, did Kant apply this theory? What has Kant posited as *being*? This is a question to which the Kantian metaphysic is dumb; and it is the question which Herbart devoted himself to answer. Herein Herbart would supplement Kant, he would analyse the true

¹Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Par. 627.

nature of reality, of noumenal being, as opposed to mere appearance, or that which is changeable and phenomenal. Thus whereas idealism has no use for the *Ding-an-sich*, the unchangeable and unknowable kernel of reality beneath or behind the phenomenal world, it is to Herbart the principal feature of the Kantian dialectic. Herbart only regrets that Kant has not analysed or explained this "true" notion of being.

It is not to be thought that Herbart would set things on one side, thought on the other; and then try to get the things somehow into an alien mind. He did not sever objects from thought; he severed objects and thought alike from true being or reality. He was glad to think that Kant had done away with the older form of the metaphysical problem, so that the question was no longer, how do objects become intelligible to us? After the Kantian *Critiques*, says Herbart, it can no longer be held that things are just *there*, and admit of comprehension "by the ontological predicate."¹ In future one may take ideas just in the same way as things, according as one finds them, since both the one and the other are for us, in us, and through us. After Kant, in short, the notion necessarily developed, that thought and things cannot except in an abstract way be separated; that they are not given the one without and the other within the self, but both in a unity, and this unity consciousness. This would have been a solution grateful to Leibnitz, for whom the soul appeared to bring forth all ideas from an inner activity subject only to the regulation of a pre-established harmony. So Herbart says, and adds that the true difference between Kant and Leibnitz consisted in this, that the Kantian theory continued to admit the possibility of a sense-receptivity, without being impaled upon either horn of the dilemma of dualism. But Kant's work had been essentially critical, and had not essayed a theory of being. "Kant's work was intended to form a Critique, but not a system. . . . He did not try to accomplish, what rightly forms the central task of metaphysics, namely to elucidate what is matter, and what spirit."² That this is a fair characterisation is shown not only by Kant's usage of the word *critique*, but much more by the synthetic activity of both realists and idealists after his day, to whom he had at least as it were propounded a

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Par. 33.

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. 1828. Par. 39.

set of questions that could only be adequately answered after decades, if ever.

Herbart agrees that the theory of Kant offers two ostensible advantages, an explanation of matter and an account of the freedom of the will. Passing reference has already been made in this chapter to Herbart's repudiation of transcendental freedom.¹ Nor is he more content with Kant's opinion that the substantiality of matter is only a form of thought, which Herbart dismisses as a fallacy characteristic of Kantian demi-idealism. Here it may be clearer to quote Herbart's own argument. "The whole difficulty of the idea of matter lies in this, that it should be real and in space.² As real, it must consist of monads; as in space, it must needs be a continuum. But these two demands are absolutely incompatible. Kant sacrificed the former; and he could do this easily, because according to his opinion the substantiality of matter is only a form of thought. The advantage of this view seemed very great; for now nothing stands in the way, we can throw ourselves into the arms of geometry and mathematical physics without reserve, without closer criticism. How should anyone, who esteems mathematics aright, fail to be deeply rejoiced? . . . And yet the advantage was nothing but an illusion; Kant's doctrine of nature is false from beginning to end."³ Herbart admits the monads and denies the continuum, which he none the less uses as a methodological postulate.

As to the post-Kantian philosophers, it seemed to Herbart that they had only made confusion worse confounded. They had in his opinion inextricably and disastrously commingled ideas that to his mind were almost disparate, the ideas namely of the possible, the real and the necessary. Kant had done well, thought Herbart, to definitely sever the notions of being and duty;⁴ but only to have them confused over again in the systems of his idealistic followers. Herbart agreed that Kant had also done well to suggest the notion of a harmony between the law of duty and the activity of the will. This very harmony is what Herbart calls inner freedom.⁵ So far as this definition goes, an idealist might agree to it, were it not that his characterisation

¹Section 2.

²*Dass sie ein räumliches Reales sein soll.*

³*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 39.

⁴*Sein und Sollen.*

⁵*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Königsberg, 1828. Par. 39 (I. p. 116)

of the activity of the will would differ materially from that of Herbart.

Kant however probably never intended his distinction between *Sein* and *Sollen* to be ultimate. At any rate, having separated them in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he brought them once more into a single teleological process in the more synthetic, more idealistic, *Critique of Judgment*. With the latter Critique, to Fichte the most inspiring of all Kant's works, Herbart had but little sympathy. "It refers to an ideal world wherein reality and duty coincide to such an extent that the first condition of all esthetic judgments, namely the entire severance of two members of a relation, and consequently the value of the harmony between insight and will to which reference has already been made, must vanish. But an ideal world, wherein moral values are reduced to nothing, is not for us."¹ To the latter sentence an idealist might give in his adherence, but hardly either to the antithesis or rather divorce of reality and duty, or the identification of morality with an esthetic harmony. Meantime Herbart's argument may perhaps be stated in the following terms. Morality consists in an "esthetic" harmony between knowledge and will; but if the *is* and the *ought* in any sense coincide, then knowledge and will become identical and morality disappears. At the root of this reasoning seems to lie Herbart's inclination for rigid antitheses. For him the *is* and the *ought* are either one, or not one; and he will not see with the idealist a unity in difference, or a good in error. Thus Herbart recognises in symbolism only a burden on education; nor has he much of Froebel's faith that *what is* will naturally tend to become *what ought to be*.

4. *The relation of Herbart to Spinoza and Leibnitz.* Herbart looked for inspiration not only to Kant, but beyond him to Spinoza and Leibnitz, chiefly the latter. Spinoza had begun with the Cartesian view of substance, as that which exists unconditioned by anything else. This substance is not only the cause of all finite things, it also *is* them; and to it Spinoza gives the name of God. It is defined as *causa sui*, because the essence of it involves existence. This divine substance then is invested by the human understanding with the two attributes of matter and spirit, which are however merely contingent. But what of the specific forms in which substance is particularised? These

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Königsberg, 1828. Par. 39.

Spinoza calls *modi*. Man is a *modus*. *Modi* are to Spinoza no more than temporary expressions of substance, even as waves of the sea. They have no freedom, and only a borrowed reality. Mere *matter*, as Herbart insists, is therefore no more real to Spinoza than to Leibnitz or Kant. "Leibnitz arrived at monads; the merely extended was not to him the true. Spinoza explained substance as indivisible, therefore to him also that which is divisible is not the true. Both united thought to the true (reality); Leibnitz set it in every individual monad, Spinoza in the whole. Kant . . . explained matter as mere appearance."¹

Whatever then the Herbartian metaphysic may seem to imply for education, it turns away from materialism. For Herbart as for Spinoza, Kant and Leibnitz, matter is not itself real. The Kantian metaphysic appealed to Herbart even more than that of Leibnitz or Spinoza; for it was Herbart's belief that Kant alone had the true idea of being or reality, which the older school had constructed out of essence and existence. This theory of the older school, because it explained reality as though reality itself were constituted by something behind it, was inconsistent with Herbart's view of reality as mere *position*, that is to say, as something merely posited, although a form of the older theory was not without its contemporary champion in Jacobi. The metaphysic of Spinoza, which lends itself so readily to an idealistic construction that it became an invaluable source of inspiration to the post-Kantian idealists, admitted of varying *degrees* of reality. The more pregnant the potentiality, the richer the *causa immanens*, the greater would the fulness of reality be. "Everywhere one can see the notion peeping through, that reality primarily reveals itself in its manifestations, in its effects; and therefore if it did not so show itself, it would be nothing!"² False as this Spinozistic theory may be to the principles of the Herbartian metaphysic, for which reality has neither degree nor quality, it may appear to the modern reader to anticipate in a remarkable way one of the fundamental positions of contemporary pragmatism.

Herbart had more sympathy with Leibnitz than with Spinoza. Even what seemed to be errors in Leibnitz were attributed by

¹Allgemeine Metaphysik. Par. 57.

²Allgemeine Metaphysik. Par. 72.

Herbart to the misfortune of the former in living before the development of a new chemistry and physics. Had Leibnitz but lived in post-Kantian times, he might have lost all desire to develop the germ of idealism, *der Keim des Idealismus*, that lay enveloped in his theory of a pre-established harmony. The idealism of Leibnitz was hidden from himself, or at least so thought Herbart; and had Leibnitz lived in a later age, his own scientific sympathies might have at the least alienated him from the romanticist school. As against Spinoza, yet conformably to the view of Herbart, Leibnitz ventured to be a pluralist. For him reality did not cleave together in an indivisible substance; but consisted of independent monads following their own destinies.¹ Powerfully influenced as he admitted himself to be in his pluralism and realism by the atomic theory which was then supreme in chemistry, Herbart believed it to imply that the independence of the monads might be less absolute than Leibnitz had in his own day imagined. In that case the pre-established harmony might have been dispensed with, and a better understanding might have been reached on the subject of the relation of mind and body. Mind and body according to Herbart interact, but have not the parallelism suggested by the Leibnitzian pre-established harmony or the Spinozistic doctrine that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.²

5. *The relation of Herbart to Fichte and Schelling.* To Fichte and Schelling the unknowable residuum of reality, or the thing in itself, which Kant had postulated in order to explain cognisable phenomena, and which Herbart had welcomed as perhaps Kant's chief contribution to metaphysical theory, seemed little more than an aberration from a truer idealism. They belonged to a period of which it was said that metaphysic had died heirless, and the things-in-themselves had been put to auction.³

Fichte seems to have commanded Herbart's respect; but not his adherence. Of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* Herbart writes: "It is a wild landscape, but the landscape is nature."⁴ To introduce a new problem into metaphysic, this is no small achievement, and this in a way is what Fichte did. His new problem was that of the self or Ego. Fichte held the self to be absolute. For

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 79.

²*Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.*

³Da die Metaphysik vor Kurzem unbeerbt abging, Werden die Dinge-an-sich jetzo sub hasta verkauft.

⁴*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 96.

him there was no place for things-in-themselves, because the outer world was but a *Nicht-Ich*, a non-Ego, a self-set limitation. To Herbart on the contrary the Ego is not the whole problem of metaphysic. The Ego is given, is therefore possible; and the object of enquiry is merely its condition. "My whole impulse," wrote Fichte in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, "is derived from absolute independence and self-sufficiency; before I have recognised it as such I have not completely determined myself, nor, in contradistinction to myself, things."¹ Fichte's metaphysical system mystically concludes in the complete annihilation of the individual, and his blending or merging in the pure absolute pattern of reason. Freedom may be said to be the cardinal principle of Fichte; for if phenomena themselves be self-determined, it follows that determination by phenomena is only a veiled self-determination that in no wise may limit the transcendental self. Fichte spoke of the self as though no problem existed outside of it. The modern idealist is content to claim that no problem exists for the self which is unrelated to it.

For Schelling, as a romanticist and almost a mystic, Herbart seems to feel less regard than for Fichte. Ever since Kant, he thought, philosophy had in a sense degenerated, but with Schelling came the deluge. "The most perverted counted now for the best, and Kant's authority served to fortify attempts that were as immature as they were visionary."² Yet, admitting the difficulty of interpreting Schelling aright, admitting his trick of leaving the common paths of reason for the by-ways of romanticism, and even admitting the consequent barbarity of his scientific deductions, it remains true that not only does Schelling write as one inspired, but also that his doctrine of nature may be regarded as a wholesome corrective to Fichte's subjectivism. Those principles which Herbart called the Schellingian *prejudices*, that philosophy must be monistic, and that the principle of knowledge must be the principle of reality, are not only vital to Froebel's educational theory; but probably, if rightly interpreted, to idealism. Again, though to Herbart none of Schelling's principles was less welcome than unity in plurality, there are now few principles as assured, especially since the doctrine

¹Cf. Herbart, *Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Königsberg, 1828, Par. 96 (I. p. 282).

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Par. 39 (Vol. I. p. 122).

of organic evolution, as ideal unity in a manifold of parts. "One would think that with Schelling everything is possible. . . . Unity in the manifold is with Schelling by no means impossible; since unity is postulated, and the manifold is given."¹ This is for Herbart a contradiction. The unity itself would have to be manifold, and therefore no unity. It might however be replied that the contradiction is verbal and logical only; that, further, it is transcended even in thought in the category of organism. Here the educator needs to choose between Herbart and Schelling; for the notion of the one in many, unintelligible to Herbart but vital to Schelling and Froebel, is the principle of symbolic education. The argument for symbolism, very briefly recapitulated, is that the world is a system, such that the whole is implied in each part, and in such a way that the implication is discernible at least for the man of genius. Possibly one may set over against this theory, without destroying it, the guarded empiricism of Herbart's attitude towards nature. "The true nature-seeker," Herbart writes, "is accustomed to be anxious for fear that his notions may not be able to attain to the heights of nature. Schelling is anxious, for fear that nature may not reach up to his own notions. And he has reason to be so! For what particular attains to the whole? But, according to Schelling, what particular can fail to be the whole? Where, where is the unity of his bond, if nature will not obey, if it will not fulfil the expectations of the man of genius?"²

II.

Having now an idea of the philosophical relations of Herbart, one may proceed to an analysis of his metaphysic. For the psychology and the educational theory of Herbart are not ultimately intelligible apart from his theory of reality and his theory of knowledge. The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, will be found to be connected not only with the theory of reality, or ontology; but also, and that in an intimate way, with the Herbartian psychology and education.

1. *The methodology of Herbart.* The terminology of the metaphysic of Herbart may require a brief word of explanation.

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 104.

²*Ibid.* Par. 107.

The subject falls, he would say, into two classes, general metaphysics, and applied metaphysics. The scope of applied metaphysics includes cosmology, psychology, and natural theology. Ontology, in the large sense, involves the treatment of methodology, ontology proper, synechology, and eidology. Of these, methodology is the treatment of principles and methods. Ontology proper comprises the doctrines of being, becoming, substance, and cause. Synechology is literally the doctrine of the continuum, including space, time, motion, and the most general application of these ideas to life and nature. Finally eidology, or the doctrine of phenomena as such, comprises attempts to discern how far ideas may be able to furnish us with a true cognition. Eidology is the virtual equivalent of epistemology.

Herbart begins the *Methodology* with the remark that the difference between the scholar on the one hand, and the teacher or independent thinker on the other hand, is that the former is content to see nature taken to pieces and put together again, like a machine, before his eyes; but not so the latter. He, the independent thinker, seeks to know how one may begin to find the *real*. First of all, then, he asks what is given. Is the unity of all things given? Yes, Froebel seems to say;¹ but no, answers Herbart. "Neither the whole, nor the one, is given."² But what then is given? Why, answers Herbart, that which is given is *experience*. Things are brought before the mind by the psychological mechanism natural to man. They appear as complexes of attributes,³ apparently extended in space, changeable, doing and suffering things done. Metaphysic has to investigate the validity of these common sense views. To this investigation Herbart would attach almost a pragmatic significance. In other words, metaphysic is to be not only reflection; but reflection with power, or *comprehension*.

Philosophical reflection has at all times, says Herbart, seen the given, that is to say experience, as *matter* and *form*. What then are the matter and form of experience, and to what extent may they be subject to philosophical criticism? "The matter of the given is feeling. This was never an object of doubt, and can never become so."⁴ But, adds Herbart, the form is an object of

¹As in the opening paragraphs of the *Education of Man*.

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Par. 165.

³*Complexionen von Merkmalen*.

⁴*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Par. 169.

doubt, because it is not immediately given in the way that feeling is immediately given. Kant therefore did well to criticise the forms or categories of experience; and this, Kant's procedure, is also Herbart's. None the less would Herbart admit that ultimately the categories of experience are given, only not *immediately*. It was his conviction that he who considers the series of ideas, the laws of their reproduction, and the results of their tendencies to complication and fusion, will come to think "that those systems overlook a great deal, which, bowing to idealism, would persuade him that the forms of experience must be deduced from original forms of the possibility of knowledge."¹

Whether or no the forms or categories of the mind be an original factor in experience, Herbart was as convinced as Kant that they should be subjected to a critical investigation rather than be accepted at their face value. Space appears to be a merely relative limitation. Time is a measure of change. Causality itself can hardly be explained as the mere succession of antecedents and consequents. But if time, space and causation are not what they seem, may not this be equally true of reality; and therefore, may not the current valuation of reality be subject to a similar discount?

The idealists, as Herbart not unfairly suggests, must have reality in the soul, in consciousness. Here only, in self-consciousness, if anywhere at all, is certainty, reality and truth. *Cogito, ergo sum*. Yet, to Herbart's way of thinking, it is an error thus to posit one element of experience as the reality which explains it all. Everything that is given in experience counts originally for real, and its claim to reality is only suspended, not denied, when we find that we cannot think of it in the form in which it was first given. Accordingly all that is needful is that the notion of reality should be separated from the quality which is ascribed to it by the common-sense intuition. The question is no longer what is reality, but *what sort of reality*, and this is the problem of Herbart's *Ontology*.² In fairness to Herbart it may be repeated that he would begin with experience, and end with experience, and that his reals or monads are no more designed to express the meaning of the world than a scaffold the meaning of a building.

¹*Ibid.* Par. 170.

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Königsberg, 1828. Par. 192.

2. *The ontology of Herbart.* The *Ontology* opens with a logical criticism of the term *real*.¹ A ship sails by the shore. From her deck the trees upon land seem to move, but their movement is not real, while the movement of the ship *is* real. Again, paper is different from flax. The difference is real, and yet the paper is really one and the same with the flax, the linen, from which it is made. In these illustrations three realities are typified, those namely of a movement, and of a condition, and of a substance. But again, one may differentiate between a thing being real and being reality. If a man discover new properties in a thing, is it correct to say that he has discovered more reality? According to Herbart, it is hardly so. All that can be said is that he has learned to know reality in a new way. The reality is the thing itself, and not its properties; which are called indeed real, but not reality.² Thus perhaps even the vulgar use and wont of speech, pressed into the service of philosophic argument, might have exposed the "error" of Spinoza, that how many attributes a thing has, so much has it of reality.³ Only in appearance, thinks Herbart, do attributes measure reality. The so-called "real" movement of a ship, the "real" difference of paper and flax, and the "real" identity of both, for Herbart belong alike in the last analysis to the world of mere phenomena.

Therefore for Herbart true reality has nothing in common with these ostensibly real happenings. The reality that is the ground and source of all phenomena must be sought outside of the phenomena themselves. It must exclude change, which as the specious concurrence of irreducible atoms cannot have metaphysical reality. It is true that this conclusion was favoured and probably suggested by an atomic theory of chemistry that is not so well accredited at the present day.

But perhaps, if change be not real, there is nothing real. "Therefore we will utter the dictum; Nothing is! There is no reality."⁴ Yet not for long is this scepticism conceivable; it barely flits across the path of the Herbartian dialectic and reappears no more. "Let a man plunge into nothingness as he will, the course of the world goes steadily on. Now a man may very easily find the way from the world to nothing, but then he finds

¹i. e. *wirklich*.

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Par. 196.

³*Allgemeine Metaphysik*. Par. 197.

⁴*Ibid.* Par. 199.

the path of return closed to him. He cannot return again from nothingness to the world! Of every thing, of every event it may be said, you are nothing, and you do nothing. But things go on appearing; and involve us in the question, whence then can the appearance come? For it is clear that if nothing is, then nothing must appear."¹

So there is something real, and yet it is not appearance. "We have now the *given*, as the actual appearance, whether it be of things, or conditions, or movements, as opposed to the *real*, which lies at its foundation."² All that is so far ascertained of this *real* is that it is positive. An effectual appearance cannot be explained by a negative reality. "The quality of the real is entirely positive or affirmative, without admixture of negation."³ Also the real must be *einfach*, simple. For suppose it to be manifold, and to contain two determinations, A and B. Then these cannot by our hypothesis be reducible to a unity, or else this unity, and not A and B, would be the true quality of the real. But then, A and B would each without the other be insufficient to constitute the real; they would be merely relative, and reality would lose its absolute, positive character. Reality is then positive and simple. Unto these conclusions Herbart would add two others. "The quality of the real is absolutely inaccessible to all ideas of quantity," for a manifold real would contradict simplicity. "How much, or how many, *is*, remains quite undetermined by the idea of the real."⁴ In other words, though each real be necessarily simple, there may be many reals. The distinction is between manifold *in* reality and manifold *of* reality, of which the former only is forbidden, and the latter admissible.

Having now arrived at a more definite notion of reality, as something made up of positive and simple reals, Herbart turns to the venerable problem of inherence. For him the common sense theory of reality as somewhat in which different attributes inhere is quite contradictory. Indeed the phenomenon of inherence is the indication of a plurality of reals. For suppose that a thing, A, have several attributes, *a, b, c, etc.* Then, according to the common sense view, A is their seat and substance, and is a real. But if a real, A is simple, and so must be equal to *a, b, c,*

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 190.

²*Ibid.* Par. 200.

³*Ibid.* Par. 206.

⁴*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 208.

etc., separately, rather than to $a+b+c+etc.$, which would make A a complex. We have now this contradictory result, that A, which is absolute, is equal to *a*, to *b*, to *c*, *etc.*, which are merely inherent in it. This is surely a contradiction, unless it be that *a*, *b*, *c*, *etc.*, are as it were contingent aspects of A, just as the square root of 64, or 2 raised to the third power, are contingent aspects of 8. But this is evidently not the case. The only solution of the difficulty is to posit several As. It does not necessarily follow that any one of these will be equal to *a*, or *b*, or *c*. All that can be said is that the attributes *a*, *b*, *c*, *etc.*, arise out of the combination of several As; or in other words, that substance is the index or witness of a plurality of reals.¹

And now the dilemma of inherence is circumvented. Substance is for Herbart "not a thing with many attributes, and it alone does not lie at the root of these attributes, but a manifold of reals must be postulated for every one of them."² For the attribute *a* may be understood the combination of reals $A'+A'+A'+etc.$, for the attribute *b*, $A''+A''+A''+etc.$, and so on, where the sign + is used to indicate mere connexion and not addition. It remains to account for the unity of attributes in one substance. This difficulty Herbart meets by the hypothesis of the identity of the first real in each combination. "It is understood of itself that the first term in all these series must be the same; and that the series should radiate as it were from the one center."³ In conclusion, what now is the *thing* of common sense? For Herbart it is not a sum or a system of attributes, as idealism tends to insist, but it *has* these attributes, only that which has these attributes is not the indivisible substance of a Spinozist metaphysic but the connection of a plurality of reals.

It follows from Herbart's ontology that there is no real change. Education is not real, character is not real, life itself is not real if one has the will to believe Herbart. The horror of these thoughts is mitigated by the recollection that for Herbart the real is not the valuable. For him the real has no value; life, education, character, the highest.

The common sense view of change is that a substance varies its attributes. A, that was once *a*, *b*, *c*, *etc.*, is now *a*, *b*, *d*, *etc.*

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 215.

²*Ibid.* Par. 218.

³*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 218.

On reflection this proves unthinkable. According to Herbart, the real situation is that *a* arises out of the connexion of reals $A'+A'+A'+etc.$, *b* from the connection $A''+A''+A''+etc.$, *c* from the connection $A''' + A''' + A''' + etc.$, and *d* from the connexion $A'''' + A'''' + A'''' + etc.$ Then the apparent change of *A*, from *a, b, c, etc.*, to *a, b, d, etc.*, really means that *A* has no longer its original connexion with the series $A'''+A'''+A'''+etc.$, but has entered into a connexion with the series $A''''+A''''+A''''+etc.$ Reality is the same as before.

But the question now arises, what is the nature of this mysterious connexion¹ of the reals? In other words, now that *being* has been explained, how is it possible to explain happening? It was from happenings, from experiential phenomena, that Herbart took his departure, and it is these which he is vitally concerned to explain. What can happen to the qualities of simple reality, or what can happen beyond them? Or how does that which happens in connexion with them lend itself to an interpretation of experience? The answer to this question is the key to Herbart's epistemology and his psychology.

Whatever happens when the reals come into connexion must be regarded as ultimate causation. Now let two reals *A* and *B* be represented by contingent aspects, as *A* by $a+\beta+\gamma$ and *B* by $m+n-\gamma$. When *A* and *B* come into connexion, there will then be left only $a+\beta+m+n$ as perceptible contingent aspects of *A* and *B*. The reals are unchanged; but their contingent aspects are alterable. "But then nothing happens! Everything stays just as it is! How can anything happen, when the real merely remains like itself?"² The only outlet is in the condition of the apparent happenings. In the illustration, the reals *A* and *B* may be regarded as differing in the quality of their contingent aspects to the extent γ , so that on coming into connexion they tend to disturb one another to this extent γ . But *A* and *B* as unchangeable reals must preserve themselves against the tendency to a disturbance. *A* has still to be equal to $a+\beta+\gamma$ and *B* to $m+n-\gamma$, in order that apparently $A+B$ may be equal to $a+\beta+m+n$. Thus *A* and *B* have preserved themselves to the extent γ .

¹Zusammensein.

²Allgemeine Metaphysik. Par. 235. Lotze (*Metaphysics*, Book I. Chapter II.) repeats this question and rejects the solution which Herbart has to offer.

It is now possible to summarise the argument of Herbart concerning change. It is the resultant of the contact of two or more reals which differ in the quality of their contingent aspects. Acts of self-preservation are performed by the reals to the extent of their difference in quality, and out of these self-preservations as manifested in the alteration of contingent aspects is generated the appearance of change.

And now, how does man stand in relation to phenomena and to reality? Herbart is ready with the following answer: "Granted that a spectator should stand at such a point that he should not know the simple quality, but should be himself involved in the different relations of A to B, C, D, and so forth; then all that remains visible to him is the peculiarity of the individual self-preservations, not the constant similarity of their origin and their result. This is the standpoint of Man.¹ So Herbart comes to regard feelings as the self-preservations of the soul, which is ignorant at once of its own nature, and of the fact that its experiences, all-important as they are to itself, depend upon happenings in connection with reals outside of it, of whose own self-preservations it can know nothing.

3. *The Cosmology of Herbart.* In the *Synechology* or *Cosmology* Herbart reverses the analytic procedure by which in the *Ontology* he has arrived at the fundamental doctrines of his realism. Arduous is now the task before him, no less than to reconstruct from his reals, and from the theory of their self-preservations, the world of human experience. Few will maintain that Herbart has succeeded here. In order to explain the appearance of matter he introduced what he regarded as a fictitious category, that of a continuum, or of partially overlapping points, precisely as the mathematician employs so imaginary a quantity as $\sqrt{-1}$. The use which Herbart makes of this methodological device is ingenious. For although in the case of two reals A and B the reals must disturb one another to the extent of their difference in quality, yet, do we suppose three or more reals in connexion, we are obliged to conceive a preservation that appears no more than partial. In reality the preservation must be complete, because the reals are unalterable, but it will appear to be incomplete. For B as against A and A'

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Königsberg, 1828. Par. 236.

must appear to preserve itself only in part or else to have a doubled self-preservation which is inconsistent with our hypothesis. The rest is easy. Out of a tendency to complete the self-preservation will arise the notion of attraction. Repulsion will arise from a tendency to hinder the completeness of the self-preservation.¹ Several As and Bs, armed with their specious attractions and repulsions, form aggregates that convey the idea of a corporeal mass. So matter has been reconstructed from the reals, if possibly with a certain disregard for concreteness.

Like matter, time and motion may be explained by the fiction of a continuum, in which the reals appear to lie, although they do not. Changes in motion are not real, and yet they are the objective appearance of the contacts of reals; and, further, to the human observer they appear as in time, and even, because they partly overlap, as in continuous time. Thus, although to the real in itself the categories of space and motion do not apply; yet for the observer, the real is to be regarded as at rest in its own space, but moving in the spaces of other reals.² The real is timeless, yet out of its meetings with other reals there arises the notion of time. The real is immaterial, yet out of these meetings there comes also the notion of matter.

In all this argument the objection perhaps holds, that the more ingenious, the more elaborate, the more mathematical it is, the more does it commend itself alike to our admiration and our unbelief. At least this tends to be true of persons of the concrete type of mind, whose feelings and will rebel against the abstractions of its intellectualism.

4. *The epistemology of Herbart.* That part of his metaphysic which Herbart calls the Eidology deals with the epistemological problem of how man may be able to act as a spectator of the objective semblance of the interaction of reals. Its problem then is the problem of the self, and covers the determination of the origin and possibility of ideas, the process of knowledge, and the general foundations of psychology.

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 270.

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 283.

In general, idealistic solutions of the problem of the self have rested upon the assumption of an identity between the self as knower and the self as known; in more technical terms, of the subjective and objective Ego. As Spinoza expresses it, if any man know anything, then he also knows that he knows it, and he knows again his knowledge of the knowledge and so on to infinity. Yet between the self as knower and as known, though there may possibly not be a difference, there is clearly a valid distinction. For Herbart the distinction is absolute. "If the known be a certain A, then the knowledge of A is not A itself; and the sum, A plus the knowledge of A, is no Ego."¹

What solution is offered by Herbart for the problem of the Ego? Whatever it be, it must affect his educational theory. For Herbart in the first place the Ego, being a subject and real, as such remains unknown like other reals. This however is only true of the metaphysical soul. The empirical Ego, or the Ego as object, is to be regarded as a complex of attributes, and so falls under the category of inherence which Herbart has been at pains to analyse. Not the real Ego therefore, but the Ego as known, is a resultant of forces taking their rise in the self-pervations of reals. The investigation of these forces is the task of psychology. "The soul is not originally a power of reflection, an impulse and the like. Neither is it constructed out of real and ideal activity, as Fichte would have it. Rather must its whole spiritual diversity be supposed to consist in an adequate number of determinations of a manifold connexion with other and again other reals."²

But if man cannot know reality itself, and if thus the real soul be past his ken, he has the consolation of knowing actual happenings. His sensations, the material of all his knowledge, are themselves the preservations of his soul against other reals. Sensations, as the resultants of the meetings of reals, compel him to posit these reals.

5. *Certain implications for education.* Upon the metaphysic depends the psychology of Herbart, and upon the psychology, the education. But it is seldom remarked that the theory

¹*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 323.

²*Allgemeine Metaphysik.* Par. 364.

of education of Herbart is dependent upon a metaphysic. One would imagine that its utmost genesis were in psychology as such. And yet on maturer consideration it may be doubted to what extent psychology, as descriptive and experimental, may alone and unaided give even a tentative answer to any fundamental educational problem. In the case of the educational theory of Herbart, at least three of its major principles seem to merely filter through a psychological medium in the course of their derivation from a rarer metaphysical source. For methodological reasons these principles may be stated in negative form. They are, that education is not real, that education is not free, and that it does not proceed by an organic or evolutionary unfolding of the human spirit. This bald and negative formulation, though in itself it may do Herbart less than justice, may temporarily subserve the antithetical method because of its almost absolute contrast with the foregoing analysis of the educational theory of Froebel.

For Herbart education is not real. Reality is unchangeable, and the educator can only manipulate the iridescent colors on its surface. It is true that for Herbart worths are constituted by these colors and not by reality, as the worth of a diamond may be said to reside in its fires. Yet some will think it degrading that education should be mere appearance. It is not a satisfactory hypothesis for the educator that the essence of things is not amenable to moral predication, and can never be a whit the better or worse for all his efforts.

And again, for Herbart ideas arise out of an interaction of reals over which the self has no power. Freedom exists as an externally produced harmony, but it is admitted that such freedom is only a specious pretence of moral autonomy, and is not real. It is not even in process of becoming transcendental.

Finally, for Herbart education is strictly not a development. According to the fundamentals of his metaphysic it should be an aggregation of ideas, due to undirigible self-pervations of reals. It is true that in the psychology Herbart gets far away from so untenable a position, that he introduces fusions and blendings of ideas, and subjects these processes to a mathematical régime. But ever at the root of these

changes there lurks the atomism of the metaphysic. It seems to be a fundamental and consistent assumption of the mathematical psychology of Herbart that the ideational units remain true throughout every fusion to their isolation, independence, and mutual externality.

But although he may sympathise with the Herbartian psychology, no modern educator will subscribe to the metaphysic of Herbart. For the crucial transition from a set of originally unrelated reals to a phenomenal world of relations is too severely unintelligible to win permanent adherence even from sympathetic minds.¹ If indeed it were really thinkable that all relations may be external to their terms, then surely it should follow that relations are pure illusion.² But in the assumption of self-preserving activities among the reals Herbart has smuggled into his system as it were a core of idealism; and while it is true that his psychology and educational theory have never lost the impression of their pluralistic origin, it is conceivable that this core of idealism may be sponsor to some part of their validity.

III.

1. *The so-called faculties.* It is now possible to turn to the psychology of Herbart. In the judgment of Beneke, the two chief advances of modern psychology were made respectively by Locke and Herbart, in that the former dealt a mortal blow to the theory of innate ideas, and the latter to the theory of innate faculties. Herbart found that the so-called faculties are no more than classifications of mental phenomena. To make them prior to such phenomena is to lapse into the fallacy of the physician who argues that a certain draught produces sleep because it is possessed of a soporific faculty. Even as classifications, the faculties seemed to Herbart to be unreliable in the absence of the needful empirical data of psychology, although in so far as present conditions are concerned, it would seem that the validity of this objection to the faculties has been diminished in proportion to the successful activity of the recent period of psychological research.

¹Cf. Lotze, *Metaphysics*. Book I. Chapter I.

²Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*. London, 1903. p. 148.

But a "faculty" psychology offers yet another difficulty. Its basis is in introspection, and introspection alters its own object. "Self-observation mutilates the facts of consciousness in the very act of seizing them."¹ Upon these three grounds, then, Herbart would reject the psychology of the faculties. First, it offers an explanation which is no explanation; second, its forms are ill grounded in empirical fact; and third, of its own nature it deceives itself.

Only one classification suggestive of the faculties retains the respect of Herbart. Usage compels him to adopt the terminology of conception, feeling and desire. Even these are unscientific terms, and to add to them other supposititious faculties, and to erect upon these a weighty superstructure, is to build an aerial castle on a mythology of the mind.

As the destroyer of causal faculties Herbart reaches psychological greatness. But he may have harried them beyond necessity. Though there be no original cut-and-dried faculties, there may be original mental tendencies. Such tendencies, though they may do violence to the Herbartian metaphysic, are indicated by the a priori mental categories of Kant and the mental predispositions of heredity. Here in a sense is visible the fundamental psychological antithesis in Herbart and Froebel. For Herbart the mind is ideational content; for Froebel it has from the outset a unity of form. Only perhaps from an evolutionary point of view may the unity and polarity of the mind be duly co-ordinated and synthesised.

2. *Ideas as dynamic.* If there be no principles of unity in the mind, no faculties, no forms, and no original tendencies to faculties, principles or forms, then the mind must be some sort of aggregate of isolated ideational forces. For Herbart, ideas are atomic forces, which are false to their atomism only to the extent of fusions and blendings that mask their plurality without reducing it. In chemistry one is familiar with the notion of irreducible and disparate elements behind every compound. In like way Herbart, with the whole school of associationists, seems to assume that the most complex thought may be resolved in the limit into a plurality of unrelated ideas. For Herbart in particular these ideas are con-

¹*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie.* Königsberg, 1834. Par. 3.

stant enough, independent enough, self-identical enough to be amenable to mathematical treatment. But although it may be needless to follow him into a statics and dynamics¹ of the mind that are based upon a vague analogy of mental tensions to physical forces, yet it may not be wasteful, and it may not be superfluous, to refer merely to the central thought of Herbart in this theory, the thought of ideas as dynamic.

For Herbart concepts become forces when they resist one another. They are independent of original mental unities. The mind itself is a series of masses of them, each mass rising or falling from the threshold of consciousness according to its groupings and consequent trains of association. It is true that in the most recent psychology the association of ideas is a less prominent category than stimulus and reaction. But the category of association, and the theory of ideas as independent forces upon which it is built, retains a limited validity. For a moment, then, one may take the point of view of Herbart. What happens when concepts resist one another? Experience finds that they are not destroyed, nor left unchanged; they are subject to change, but not annihilation. "The real concept is changed into an effort to present itself."² Therefore only remove hindrances, and concepts will tend to reproduce themselves. Here is evidently the principle of involuntary memory. For Herbart the metaphor of tensions between concepts is a pretext for a statics and dynamics of the mind to treat respectively of equilibrated and disturbing concept-forces. On the aptness of this metaphor depends much of the validity of the educational system of Herbart.

Let us attempt to subject the metaphorical theory of Herbart to an empirical verification. The mind is to be a product of independent forces called ideas. Now the phenomena of experience which seem to corroborate this view include especially dreams, reverie, the facts of abnormal psychology, habit and the feeling of inhibition in attention.

In dreams, when the reference to ends in which the unity of consciousness perhaps consists is laid aside, it would seem that the mind is resolved into a chaos of irresponsible

¹*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie.* Königsberg, 1834. Par. 13.

²*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie.* Par. 11.

notions which rise and fall and make combinations by virtue of the arbitrary independence of each. And if there be a continuity in dreams, it is at best fantastic. It appears to be purely associative, and subject to no guiding process of discrimination. Yet it remains not only true that the independence of ideas in dreams is apt to be relative, and to this extent conditioned by some unity of purpose, however fanciful it may be; but it also remains true that the large amount of independence which ideas may be said to possess is essentially of a secondary and derivative character. The ideas of the dream consciousness, like those of habit, appear to have originated out of the stress and strain of a mental reaction upon specific stimuli. In that case the interaction of independent ideas is inadequate as a category for the explanation of dreams. The basis of association appears to be less one of subjective cohesion than objective teleological reference.

As in dreams, so in reverie, the mind seems to function sometimes more by compartments than as a whole. The mind as will seems dormant, while concepts mass themselves as best they may. Yet reverie may hardly be more than a recapitulation and reorganisation of genuine teleological thought. Therefore ultimately it would appear to make less for an atomism of ideational forces than a purposeful mental unity.

Most of all in hypnotic suggestion, and more generally in the facts of abnormal psychology, is there evidence for supposing the soul to be at the mercy of its states. Such evidence seems indisputable so far as it goes. But again, it would appear that the phenomena of suggestion in hypnotism only point in a secondary way to an atomism of ideas. Primarily they are only made possible through a previous unitary experience belonging to the hypnotic subject. To illustrate, the hypnotic subject who is told to raise a finger can do so only because he knows what a finger is and how to raise it. The polarisation of his ideas is then made possible by their previous organic relation, and hardly points to the original independence of conceptual forces. As in dreams, and reverie, and abnormal psychology, so in habit also is there evidence of the independence of ideas

in relation to the unity of the normal mental process. It is probably fair to say that the Herbartian psychology is before all things a psychology of habit. For it is in habit that ideas become fixed in their associations, and it is in habit that they appear to be most independent in their activities. It is true that there is something incongruous about the notion of an association of atoms. On the other hand, however incongruous it may be, it is not only fundamental to the Herbartian metaphysic, but it not unsuccessfully interprets the facts of psychology in so far as these are chosen from the realm of habit alone. If consciousness were no more than habit the psychology of Herbart might be an acceptable account of its phenomena.

But habit is only the static side of consciousness, the primary nature of which is dynamic. Genetically and biologically, the office of consciousness would appear to be the performance of imperative readjustments. Perhaps the early development of the human consciousness may have been correlative with the need of an increased wariness against animals stronger than man, or with the necessity for an increased wisdom in the search for food. In any case, consciousness would be genetically and primarily not a number of clear ideas, but a subjective response and awakening to the stress and strain of critical situations. It is out of conflict and confusion, and often out of haziness and vagueness that ideas arise. Apparently the clearness and immediacy of ideas in habit, illustrated by the almost reflex obedience of a trained soldier to the command "attention" or "halt" even though he be off duty, may be explained by the cumulative effect of a recurrence of approximately the same solutions to approximately the same problems in experience. It is then out of the problematic situation that ideas arise. But the problematic situation or crisis is a case where the combined energies of the self are brought into requisition for a single end. In other words, in the ultimate limit the being of ideas is evidence of a unitary, teleological, mental process.

Concepts however may be forces, without being independent forces. The phenomenon of inhibition in attention

seems to point to an inner striving, and an inner striving should imply something to strive against. Ideas are at war among themselves apparently in the spirit of the Herbartian psychology. And yet it is conceivable that the strife of ideas may be within and for a purposive self. Though the ideas be a divided and rebellious section of the self, yet they seem to be affiliated to the self in a sort of constitutionally indissoluble union.

3. *Reason and will.* In the psychology of Herbart, the emphasis is on apperceived content and not apperceiving activity. More simply, it is upon ideas and not will. Even desires are regarded as the appetitive tendencies of concepts and conceptual masses. And the will, the apperceiving activity which plays so large a part in the psychological theory of Wundt, is for Herbart only a kind of desire. "The faculty of desire, together with those of representation and feeling, should furnish an exhaustive classification of the mental faculties."¹ For Herbart the will is that kind of desire with which is coupled the idea of the attainment of its object. But it is possible to discriminate the will differently, as the whole personality consciously functioning in a situation, and for such an activity desire is an unconvincing name.

For Herbart the will is not free. It is not dependent upon the formal or categorical reason. "Reason is originally neither commanding nor law-giving; above all, it is not the source of willing. It is quite as little a source of knowledge. Nevertheless it is regarded as such; indeed it is thought to be the highest judge and authority, which is a very natural result."² But the reference of Herbart is to the forms of thought and not to mental content or ideas. According to the psychology of the tension of concept masses, the will cannot fail to be dependent upon presentations, concepts, ideas, if not upon reason formally as such. The will is not primary, not original. In Herbartian education it will not be evolved by constructive occupation and practical endeavour so much as erected by the intellectual reinforcement of satisfactory groups of concepts. Character will be constructed from without, to the disregard of those developmental forces

¹*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie.* Königsberg, 1834. Par. 107.

²*Ibid.* Par. 115.

of spiritual evolution upon the cooperation of which Froebel for his part did not fear to rely.

Little is said in this chapter of apperception and interest. It is true that these shibboleths in a way summarise the permanent contributions of Herbart to psychology, but for this very reason it seems unnecessary to afford them a preliminary analysis, so well-known are their chief implications. Interest and apperception will presently receive a comparative and synthetic treatment.

4. *Another interpretation of the psychology of Herbart.* A revolutionary interpretation of the psychology of Herbart has been recently advanced by Dr. Davidson of Edinburgh University.¹ The psychology of Herbart, we are told, is founded on the metaphysic of Leibnitz, and its implications are those of the "functional" psychology of Professor Adamson and Professor James.²

It is customary to regard the psychology of Herbart as obsolete in other fields than that of education. In education it is charged with the validity and invested with the authority of an empirical law. It is found to work fairly well, though to what extent its practical value may have been overrated or underrated by certain common sense departures of teachers from its implications, or possibly by the rebellious workings of the minds of pupils according to unorthodox mental laws, is a question not easy to decide. Still, the pragmatically minded will sympathise with the following argument of Dr. Davidson. "If the Herbartian theory of education 'works,' then this very fact implies that the practice of Herbartian education involves a psychological theory which must be true." The Herbartian psychology really seems to work too well not to have a quantum of validity. But our thesis as against Dr. Davidson is, that it is only valid for habit, and for mental phenomena allied to habit, that it gives no satisfactory account of attention, and that therefore it falls short of the relative completeness of a modern functional psychology. Incidentally, let it be remarked that there is a danger in deducing the psychology of Herbart from the philosophy of Leibnitz. Herbart not only knew Leibnitz but

¹*A new Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology and Educational Theory.* Edinburgh and London, 1906.

²*Ibid.*, p. 41.

criticised him;¹ and assuredly his own metaphysic, the obvious and acknowledged source of his psychology, is far from the mere result of a late recrudescence of the Leibnitzian school. There is also a danger of confusing interpretation with justification. A metaphysic may interpret, but experience alone justifies.

It is difficult to believe that either Leibnitz or Herbart had a psychology essentially functional. In Leibnitz the logical tendency is to a subjective idealism. For him reality is reducible to monads, simple, self-active, spiritual, independent beings, each a mirror of the universe, but each except God an imperfect mirror, each unfolding from within, and having no windows, and only controlled by a pre-established harmony. Matter is for Leibnitz the confused perception by a monad of other monads. And, although the perceptions of the monads differ in quality, the monads enter into no relations, but the world appears by the unfolding of the monad itself. It is difficult to make more out of this than a subjective idealism.

"When Professor James sums up by saying that 'the knowing of many things together is just as well accounted for when we call it a functioning of the soul state as when we call it a reaction of the soul,' he is only expressing in positive terms what we have tried to show is implicit in Herbart's theory of the reaction of soul."² Let us examine this as a crucial passage. First of all, what is the gist of the quoted corroboration from Professor James? It is that for certain definite psychological purposes the substantial unity of the soul is superfluous. "Herbart, as we have tried to show, considered it superfluous; and any theory of education that bases on such a principle is not entitled to rank as scientific."³ In limitation of the validity of this argument at least four considerations may be taken into account. The nature of the soul is rather a metaphysical than a psychological question, and the soul may be as metaphysically necessary as perhaps it is psychologically irrelevant. The abstract science of psychology merely as such adopts

¹*Cf.* Chapter II. 2.

²Davidson, *A new Interpretation, etc.*, p. 64.

³*Ibid.* p. 66.

an attitude of thorough-going dualism¹ which is ultimately almost unthinkable. In any case, the word *substantial* almost begs the question of a soul unity, for all real unity is probably purposive rather than substantial, as the pragmatic philosophy of Professor James virtually asserts. Finally, Herbart himself *did* believe in a real metaphysical soul. This alone would suffice to end the matter, were it not true that the real soul of the Herbartian metaphysic is a barren abstraction unrelated to the mind as known, and not an intelligible principle of unification.

Our general conclusion is that the psychology of Herbart is not equivalent to a psychology of function, if only because the latter theory will have none of the traditional Locke-Humian permanence and independence of ideas. For this very reason Professor James has criticised Herbart as one of the victims of the "psychologist's fallacy." "The thought of the object's recurrent identity is regarded as the identity of its recurrent thought; and the perceptions of multiplicity, of co-existence, of succession, are severally conceived to be brought about only through a multiplicity, a co-existence, a succession, of perceptions. The continuous flow of the mental stream is sacrificed, and in its place an atomism, a brick-bat plan of construction, is preached, for the existence of which no good introspective grounds can be brought forward, and out of which presently grow all sorts of paradoxes and contradictions, the heritage of woe of students of the mind. These words are meant to impeach the entire English psychology derived from Locke and Hume, and the entire German psychology derived from Herbart, so far as they both treat 'ideas' as separate subjective entities that come and go."²

In something like a functional psychology there is shadowed a certain synthesis of Herbart and Froebel, in that there is room both for the emphasis of Herbart upon mental content and habit, and for the emphasis of Froebel upon will and progress. According to a psychology of function, habit and attention work into and out of one another as severally the retrospective and prospective sides of a dynamic process

¹Cf. James, *Psychology*. New York, 1890. I. pp. 218-220.

²*Psychology*, 1890. I. p. 196. See also I. pp. 353-354.

in which the organism readjusts itself to imperative crises. But it is not to be imagined that such a concrete psychology is the only or the fundamental ground of a synthesis of the educational theories of Herbart and Froebel. It is purposed to indicate other such grounds, here novel and there familiar enough, in the hope that here and there they may support the educator more safely, more stably, and even on a higher level of interpretation than the more subjective opinions of individual reformers, however great.

CHAPTER III.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A PHILOSOPHICAL SYNTHESIS.

The attempt has been made to analyse firstly the philosophy of Froebel, and secondly the philosophy of Herbart. It may now be possible to adopt a more synthetic standpoint, from which an estimate may be made of the relative validity of the theories of Herbart and Froebel. Accordingly the earlier part of the present chapter is devoted to an attempt at a psychological synthesis; and the latter part to an indication of the possibility of an ethical and metaphysical synthesis.

I.

1. *The soul and the concept.* It has been admitted that associationism may be one terminus of a valid psychology. In dreams, in habit, in reverie, and in the phenomena of abnormal psychology, ideas manifest a disconcerting self-sufficiency and independence. No doubt this independence, this self-sufficiency, are relative and in a sense derivative from a unitary activity of the soul. And yet *derivative* may be too strong a word; for if there is no idea *in vacuo*, neither is there any soul known to experience without ideas. It would seem that the original activity of the soul may be conceived as a tendency at the same time to a spiritual unity and an ideational differentiation. If so, neither Herbart nor Froebel completely satisfies. Froebel thinks of the unity of the mind as something given, and in a sense from its origin fully mature; Herbart ascribes to the original soul no more power than an incomprehensible reaction to preserve itself, which changes its appearance without stirring the depth of its reality. For Herbart the unity of the mind is a product of apperceptive processes in which the forces are ideas. There would seem to be a sense in which the unity of the soul, the self or Ego if you will, is achieved rather than given; and yet also a sense in which it is implicit as a tendency from the first. Thus the category

of evolution offers a working psychological synthesis. The mind at birth may be regarded as the elementary germ both of a unified personality and differentiated ideas; and yet in such a way that the character and individuality of an adult are essentially things to be developed and achieved.

While it is not pretended that such a synthesis is authoritative, it has at least this value for a philosophy of education, that it suggests a reasonable theory of free will. Does the self function as a unity? Then it may be free. Is it swayed by independent wills called concepts? Then it is not free. For if mental activity be merely a phase of the tension of concepts, regarded as more or less independent, although capable of fusions and blendings, then the self is no more than a product of circumstances over which it has no control. Herbart is therefore a determinist, and education is for him wholly a matter of external stimuli to which mechanical responses are expected and assumed. But the logical corollary of the psychology of Froebel is transcendental freedom. Ideas are not taken seriously as independent activities; but the soul is looked upon as superior to any or all of them, and to any or all of the desires and actions that may be at the back of them. This dignified and happy view is not quite warranted by fact. The will appears to be not so transcendental but that it may be jeopardised, not so transcendental but that it may never be achieved.

What light is thrown upon this antithesis by the reconciling category of human evolution? Essentially this, that freedom appears no more to be a static thing, given once for all, or once for all withheld. Freedom may be viewed as a potentiality becoming actualised. Man may not begin with transcendental freedom, but he moves toward it. He is not wholly superior to mundane circumstance, to time, place, and opportunity; and yet he may more and more become so, not in the sense of dispensing with them, but in the sense of making them instrumental to his purposes. If he is in a sense at the mercy of his concepts, still, they are *his* concepts. It would seem to be a very practical and inspiring notion, that freedom lies in a process of becoming, in which man gradually emancipates himself from the deter-

minations of external agencies, not by disregarding such determinations, but by giving them a value, and controlling them in relation to that value. The self is not concerned to suppress the activities of ideas, but to relate and guide them. Again, according to this view the self is not one thing, and the ideas another thing; but the self is the purposeful unity of its ideas, and the ideas are differentiated attitudes of the self. What is desired, is therefore not merely, as the Froebelian psychology might suggest, the conquest of ideas by the soul, and not merely, as Herbartianism implies, the formation of concept masses that are likely to combine to good effect; rather it is on the side of the unity of the soul, a will capable of controlling habitual ideas, and on the side of mental content, ideas at once ready to be precipitated into action and amenable to the guidance of the concrete self. The Froebelian psychology with its stress upon unity tends to be formal, the Herbartian, with its stress upon content, tends to be mechanical; and the truer psychology may be one in which form and content, soul activity and idea activity, come to be regarded as normal correlatives functioning together. Then morality may be based on environment as to its origin, but on freedom as to its value and goal.

2. *Mental forms and mental content.* The emphasis which Herbart seems to set upon permanence and mental equilibrium is connected with the fundamental, and, as it stands, insuperable difficulty of passing over from the soul as an independent and unchangeable *real*, without parts or diversity, and lacking even the activity which Leibnitz had ascribed to it, to the active mind of human experience. Between these two conceptions there is a gap that Herbart would none too successfully fill by the assumption of real happenings to the extent of self-preservation of the reals against one another. If there be some real happening, then why hold the reals to be unchangeable at all? If reality change at all, even in respect of happening and not in respect of being, then it is perhaps as well to hold the changing phenomena of our experience to partake of the nature of reality, as to invent an hypothetical occurrence equally irreconcilable with a hypothesis of pure being without becoming.

"The soul," says Herbart, "has no innate natural talents nor faculties whatever, either for the purpose of receiving or for the purpose of producing. It is, therefore, no *tabula rasa* in the sense that impressions foreign to itself may be made upon it; moreover, in the sense indicated by Leibnitz, it is not a substance which includes in itself original activity. It has originally neither concepts, nor feelings, nor desires. It knows nothing of itself, and nothing of other things; also in it lie no forms of perception and thought, no laws of willing and action, and not even a remote predisposition to any of these."¹ This is not the soul as known, only Herbart's theory of the metaphysical soul. The significance for life and education of such an hypothesis appears to be that the soul as a unity, or as natural tendency, in general the *formal* soul, is negligible though existent; only the content of the soul is an object of knowledge and a source of morality.

The Herbartian psychology becomes consistently a polemic in favor of content; hence its value, and hence its formlessness. According to the synthetic psychology already indicated in this chapter, no mental content that is *merely content* is competent to create the forms of mental action, any more than such forms could of themselves realise a content. Froebel approaches the other extreme from Herbart, and makes given mental unities hew out a content for themselves after the fashion of their own inwardness. A less abstract view is that form and content are inseparable aspects of the mental process, to such a degree that the question of priority may have to be abandoned.

If it be true that Froebel tended more nearly to such a synthetic view than did Herbart, it may be attributed to the fact that he virtually adopted a category of evolution—development from within—as Herbart did not. "All human investigation," wrote Herbart, "must recognise the fundamental source of vital forces by referring them to that providence according to whose designs they were originated. No metaphysic and no experience reaches further. Every theory as to the probable creation of higher organisms from those of a lower order, can be refuted." To this Froebel might

¹*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*. Königsberg, 1834. Par. 152.

have in part agreed, but he would have insisted upon some kind of unity and development throughout nature. Herbart did not conceive, with evolutionary idealism, that life may be evolutionary and yet divine; that the development of a higher from a lower order does not degrade the former but ennoble the latter; that even the conceivable derivation of organisms from comparatively inorganic matter need only show that matter is spiritual and significant in a way not hitherto suspected; and that things are to be adjudged less according to their origins than their worths, or ends, or satisfactions. It will now be apparent that the opposition of mental forms and mental content has resolved itself into the opposition of the soul and its ideas, and that the synthesis suggested is that of an evolutionary psychology, where the category of evolution is intended to carry genetic and biological interpretation up to the level of spirit, by orientating them to future possibilities.

3. *Habit and attention.* The antithesis between the psychology of Herbart and that of Froebel is manifested anew as a relative stress upon habit and attention. When Herbart makes the claim that the Ego, even should it exist as transcendental, could as such have no value for education,¹ he appears to have in mind that the function of education is to cultivate *habits* of thought and character. When the school of Froebel, or rather of Kant, proclaims the soul to be transcendental, what is implied for education is the supremacy of will over habit, since the self is to be hailed as superior to any or all of its desires. In the synthesis, it may be possible to admit that the Herbartian cult of ideas may be a valuable account of the operations of habit, at the same time that progress may demand a Froebelian art of exercising the will in selfactivity, where selfactivity means action coupled with or hinged upon attention and initiative. For the Froebelian psychology of selfactivity seems to strengthen the psychology of Herbart just at its weakest point, which is that it expects too much from ideas when it seems to imply that they alone and in their intellectual nature will induce morality. Froebel seems to remember better than Herbart that good or bad is to be predicated of our thoughts not

¹Cf. e. g. Herbart, *Pädagogische Schriften*. hrsg. Sallwürk. I. p. 271.

after the matter but the manner of them. And yet Herbart has psychology so far on his side, that each idea tends somehow to be realised in motor activity, undirected or misdirected though the tendency may be. There is even a sense in which all effort is directed towards the supremacy of some idea. If ideas had no *relative* objectivity, or, what means the same thing, if habit had no force, then there would be no check upon the momentary vagaries of the self, and no truth better than a doubtful structure reared upon momentary subjective impulses. In a synthetic psychology, in a psychology of function, there is place then for the emphases of Herbart and Froebel alike. The mind in attention goes out to an object as with Froebel, and the resultant idea returns upon the mind as with Herbart.¹ And again, what becomes of the opposition of attention and habit, if habit be funded attention, and attention be accommodatory habit? The opposition no longer appears to inhere in the facts, but only in the point of view.

4. *An evolutionary psychology.* There are those whose functional psychology does not carry them the length of the category of evolution. These may accept a reconciliation of the psychology of Herbart with that of Froebel, so far as concerns the functioning of the habit and attention of an agent in a given situation. But those who would go further with mental evolution, and, without interpreting mind merely from a genetic standpoint, still find it an ever-developing factor in the experience of the child and the race, may take their point of departure with Mr. Bosanquet, from "a continuous presentation, to be described either as feeling, or as others would say, as having the three aspects of feeling, conation and sensation (or cognition)."² The original continuous presentation is not to be viewed as mere form, a pure Ego; nor as content only, a mass of independent ideas. As it functions, form and ideas will develop together. The unity of the self may be regarded as original, but as capable of higher expression; and ideas will be present as possibility, but their actualisation will be a gradual development. We are now as it were between Locke and James. For Locke,

¹Cf. *A Synthesis of Herbart and Froebel.* Welton. In *Educational Review*, Sept. 1900.

²*Psychology of the Moral Self.* London, 1897. p. 23.

ideas may vary not at all;¹ for Professor James, no two ideas are ever the same.² We are adopting a view of the mind quite reconcilable with the latter statement, as though its identity were a persistent ideal, or purposeful, unity in change.

Such a view of identity seems necessary to an interpretation of the category of evolution. One is compelled to abandon a block unity, a mere sameness, for a unity of purposeful reference. But a unity of purpose and function is very real; and perhaps in the last resort no other unity remains intelligible. Therefore it is only with a certain reservation that one affirms with Herbart, "every individual is and remains a chameleon." It is only possible to dismiss *every* form of mental unity from one's psychology, if one be prepared to dismiss with it the entire range of human purposes and values. The conception of the unity of the mind as purpose may perhaps involve a truer notion of the so-called transcendental will. Thus the will may be regarded as transcending circumstance not absolutely or with a given finality, but to the extent that the purposeful unity of the mind may be capable of subjugating side issues like the minor and subsidiary sensuous purposes. Transcendentalism is from this point of view less an endowment or even a possession of the will than a potentiality which may be starved or stifled as well as developed. Thus considered, the will is competent to regulate any presentation, or any train of ideas, only to the extent that it is exercised in doing so. Freedom exists more or less in proportion to the effort to guide rather than eradicate habitual and critical activities and ideas. The fugitive and cloistered will, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out to meet its adversary, and that Milton cannot praise,³ loses, or never wins, its "transcendental" efficacy.

5. *Mental structure and mental function.* Viewed structurally, the mind appears to consist of ideas; viewed functionally, it seems to act as a unitary will. Will and ideas are then terminal aspects of a single process; and, as a matter of

¹ *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Book II. Chapter 27.

² *Psychology*. New York, 1890. I. p. 235.

³ *Areopagitica*.

methodology, there is little to be said against placing an emphasis upon either. Psychology perhaps has to choose between two modes of procedure. The one mode is static; the investigator analyses the mental "content" at a given time. By this method one attains a sort of science of mental anatomy, or one gets as it were a cross section of consciousness. The alternative method is dynamic; it emphasises processes, and seeks to retain a reference to concrete vital conditions which the static or anatomical procedure has rigidly and even deliberately excluded. It assumes that the "anatomical" procedure is as inadequate to explain the living mind as anatomy itself to explain the physiological organism. After all, anatomy has the artificiality of an abstraction, and its purpose is to subserve something more functional and concrete. In a sense then, over against an anatomical view of the mind, a figuratively physiological view may be given a certain kind of priority; or at the least, the notion of mind as a process, as a dynamic functional principle, is to be taken into account, even when a deliberate methodology pursues the static and cross-sectional treatment of mental content. It is indeed clear that process without content, or change without permanence, or function without a structure that functions, is meaningless. Conversely content without process appears to be a fictitious abstraction, and so permanence does without change, and a structure without function. In the case of the mind, while content, permanence and structure suggest habit as the mode, and ideas as the units of its life, it is equally true that the categories of process, change and function suggest attention as mode, and character as unit. A view of the mind as essentially habit is the result of looking immediately at the structure of its content. It comes from a retrospective seeing, from looking at what is already there; from admiring the organisation of consciousness, from the revelation of its miracles of harmony already achieved and its record of already established control. One of the results for psychology of this emphasis upon organisation and habit is that ideas come to be expected to discharge all needful functions by virtue of a peculiar process of mutual association. In this

way the English associationists and Herbart accounted for the major part of the phenomena of conscious life.

The psychology of Froebel, so far as it goes, has the contrary emphasis. It is processive, dynamic, attentive, readjustive and readaptational. From its very origin the soul is active. "The newborn child, like a ripe kernel of seed-corn dropped from the mother plant, has life in itself."¹ From the psychological standpoint, Froebel cares perhaps less for habit than will, and from the ethical standpoint, less for what has been achieved than what may yet be done. Froebel is ever preoccupied with processes, and with what alone make processes intelligible, purposes.

It is not difficult to synthesise structure and function in theory, and to remark that they are mutually essential aspects of a life process. It is not difficult to add that habit and will react upon one another, and that what has been done becomes a datum for what there is to do. But it is not easy in practice to dynamically adjust the convenient *post mortem* investigation of the mind by Herbart to the attempt at a natural history of it which distinguishes Froebel. For the educator is asked to cease to think of an Herbartian psychology, or of a Froebelian psychology; and to think in their stead of an Herbartian contribution to psychology, or a Froebelian emphasis in it.

To summarise, the Herbartian account of mental phenomena may be approximately valid for the past, for habit, and possibly for physiological psychology. This last is added because it is in the nervous system that habits are formed and perpetuated. On the other hand the Herbartian psychology suffers from its unduly structural emphasis; it is abstract, in so far as it ignores the functional, accommodatory, and prospective view. It may be synthesised to advantage with what Hegel might have called its *Other*, its residual complement in psychological emphasis, that which insists with Froebel on a self-activity, or with Wundt on an apperception which partakes of the nature of an ultimate volitional function. Again, the Herbartian phase of psychology, as a psychology of the association of ideas and of habit,

¹Friedrich Froebel's *Kindergartenwesen*. hrsg. Seidel, 1883. p. 33. Or *Pedagogics of the Kindergarten*, 1895, p. 23.

may be connected with physiological psychology and may therefore be suggestive, not to say valid, for the explanation of the primitive growth of consciousness; while Froebel's psychology, emphasising the forward tendency to ends, may seem to subordinate origin to value. But a synthetic or a functional psychology looks at the process of *origin growing into value*.

6. *The self and the situation.* What has been said of habits and attention, of origins and value, of stable and dynamic mental elements, and of the tensions of ideas and self-activity, implies a theory of the self and the situation. A theory like that of Herbart, which explains mental activity as a tension of concepts, appears to disregard the phenomenon of the consciousness of self, and to attribute an overweening influence to environment. Nay, it is rejoined, does your evolutionary interpretation of the mind complain of a stress on environment? What is evolution but the outcome of environment? Does the evolutionary pot call the associative kettle black? And yet the alleged inconsistency may not be real. Evolution seems to mean more than situations, for it is not easy to see how any amount of mere environment, lacking a principle of inner activity, could produce anything.

So far as Froebel's educational system emphasises the self, and that of Herbart the situation, there is need of a synthesis. Modern psychology looks upon the agent and the situation as two sides of a process of experience. The self is a sort of focus of the situation, as the latter is in turn an objective manifestation of the agent self; and there is a sense in which each may be said to determine the other. Progress is the tale of a continuous struggle between their mutually determining forces in which the self, as conscious spirit, gradually gains the upper hand.

It needs to be added that the evolutionary psychology which has been suggested as a possible ground of synthesis may be interpreted from the side of idealism. Idealism interprets evolution, in the first place, as a process of possibility becoming realisation. The evolution is interpreted by its end, although it may not be necessary to conceive this end as perfect in the sense of static or finished. In the second place, idealism notices a modification in the methodology of

evolution. Man tends to take over the control of his own evolution from the hands of his mother nature, without denying the fundamental wisdom of her "precepts." And finally, idealism interprets evolution as grounded in the absolute, although this phrase may be taken to imply the common travail in all things of an universal spirit, rather than the transformation of the universe into an ingenious mechanical toy.

II.

In turning from the attempt at a psychological synthesis to the suggestion of a metaphysical and ethical synthesis, it will be convenient to make the transition through a discussion of the problem of freedom.

1. *Freedom.* If action be prior to thought, then ethics may possibly be prior to metaphysic. At least, one cannot go far in philosophy without adopting some attitude to the ethical problem of freedom. On the one hand, as with Froebel, freedom may be a divine endowment, and real; on the other, as with Herbart, it may be an inner harmony of ideas, the creation of circumstance. But there even seems to exist a possibility of reconciling these apparently diverse positions. That is to say, the quantum of truth in each may be manifested in a theory which will explain the facts better than either. For instance, the will may be neither free nor determined, but struggling out of determinism into freedom.

Herbart cannot reconcile himself to the notion of a transcendental freedom. How then does he include morality? For morality seems to stand or fall with responsibility, as responsibility stands or falls with the freedom of the will. Nay, seems to be the rejoinder of Herbart, although man is not free, he acts none the less under the consciousness of freedom. He therefore attributes to himself responsibility, as others attribute it to him and he to others. But responsibility stops with the actor, no matter what may be the ultimate causes or occasions of the will. "However, if it be found that the will had an earlier will as its source, the responsibility begins again anew. The depraved man, after he has become entirely bad, will be held to be completely responsible for his crimes, but these again may be laid as a burden

upon his corruptor, and so on backward as long as somewhere a will may be pointed out as the originator of those crimes."¹ This view appears to have the validity of origin, but not of end. The will is not what it was, it is not its own past causes and occasions, rather perhaps it is what it is becoming. Herbart makes freedom an illusion, because he finds causality behind it; but it may be regarded as a reality, because it has power of transcendence before it.

Herbart agrees that there exists a self-control, in the sense of capacity to repress our desires in the light of considerations of good, and that this may be properly called freedom. The stronger a man's self-control, the freer he is. "But, whether such a strength can be increased *ad infinitum*, cannot be determined by existing cases, for these indicate only a limited power."² Yet, it may be answered, if freedom as self-control be capable of ever greater advances, then it may be supposed to imply a leaven of the transcendental, or a tendency to overcome the limits of circumstance and time.

2. *Progress and equilibrium.* There would seem to be that in the temperament of the individual which affects the mode of his metaphysical thought. He may gravitate towards notions of rest, being, and permanence; or again to becoming, progress and change. It would seem that a metaphysic of unchangeable being marches with a notion of mental equilibrium, and a metaphysic of becoming with the idea of mental progress and evolution. Herbartianism tends on the whole to the notion of mental equilibrium as the end. Many-sided interest means equilibration. Indeed, many-sided interest includes also an element of progress; but there is a difference between its equable expansiveness and the passionate self-activity of idealism. This difference is perhaps largely of emphasis. An idealist will admit the need of mental balance, but will set greater store upon mental activity and the tendency to self-expression. On the other hand, the following description, by Herbart, of the normal condition of the mind, may serve to illustrate his emphasis upon equilibrium. "As the opposite of mental delusion and of passions, the

¹*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie.* Königsberg, 1834. Par. 118. Note 1.

²*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie.* 1834. Par. 119.

sound mind involves mutual determination of all concepts and desires through one another, or freedom from fixed ideas and fixed desires. As the opposite of madness and emotion, it involves repose and equanimity. As the opposite of dementia and distraction, it involves coherence and concentration of thought. As an opposite of idiocy and indolence, it involves excitability and sprightliness."¹ Only the last sentence emphasises progress, and its terms are hardly satisfactory to the idealist. To Froebel, to idealism, a sound mind is an organised system of tendencies making for expression. If these have due freedom, an adequate equilibrium should follow of itself, but it will not be an all-sided equilibrium, the same for all.

A synthesis seems to be requisite and conceivable. One may regard the mind as normally in equilibrium, but it must be a moving equilibrium; or one may regard it as a force, but it must be an equilibrated force. Perhaps a teacher may lean a little to the side of equilibrium, or of progress, according to the demands of his own disposition.

3. *Possibility and actuality.* If the notion of an equilibrated character be not static, perhaps it is comparatively so, over against the idea of character as a development in which inner potentialities are to realise their utmost value. The former, the notion of Herbart, is almost Platonic; the latter, the view of Froebel, distinctly Aristotelian.² Consider for a moment the teleological theory of Aristotle. All develops from potentialities, which in themselves are neither non-being nor actuality. Origin is to be regarded as that which in actuality is not, but potentially is; its final cause is its validity, its form, spirit, or meaning. But, so far as present conditions are concerned, the development of potentialities to actualities is a process never complete. To us, therefore, potentialities are always in excess of actualities, though it is conceivable that they may not necessarily and eternally be so. For such a conception as that of God, as a Being in whom potentialities are realised, and in whom activity is not dead but equilibrated, may suggest a reconciliation between being and becoming, permanence and activity, and

¹*Lehrbuch zur Psychologie.* 1834. Par. 149.

²Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, Books VII. and VIII. and Book IV. Chap. XII.

ideals as static and dynamic. It might be argued that the Herbartian ideal of a many-sided interest involves such a reconciliation.

The teleological emphasis of Aristotle is in line with the thought of evolutionary idealism. Life is seen as a process of becoming, from the not-yet to the shall-be, and then from the shall-be, which in the act of realisation becomes *ipso facto* another not-yet, to the higher shall-be, and so forward. For Aristotle, potentiality is that which possesses a principle of development. It is that which under suitable conditions will of its own inner self become. Evidently, applied to education, the Aristotelian concept of becoming involves a dynamic principle, universal and endless for human experience. And yet, the progressive ideal of the here and now may have its perfect pattern viewed *sub specie eternitatis*. If so, there is no ultimate contradiction between the changing and developing aim of Froebelian education, and the perfectly equilibrated and all-sided ideal of Herbart.

4. *Being and becoming.* Though it be admitted that the educational theory of Froebel is primarily concerned with potentialities, and that of Herbart with actuality as such, it remains true that the distinction is largely one of emphasis, and the opposition to a degree abstract. Herbart is further than Froebel from a concrete principle, because he will endow the soul with no original potentialities. Possibly the view of Froebel may be so given the benefit of the doubt as to clearness and consistency as to be brought into line with the suggested Aristotelian synthesis. To this synthesis may be ascribed both a metaphysical and an ethical side. On the ethical side, one has potentialities making for actualities, which again become potentialities for progress. In such a way, with Froebel, do instincts and impulses rise to the level of the social mind. But progress may be a mere illusion, or according to the suggestion of Rousseau, a real retrogression, unless there be a *summum bonum* conditioning it. Such a highest good, such a perfect ideal, may be held to pervade progressive ideals much as permanence pervades change in the physical world. Change is inconceivable without permanence, because if the result of change have no identity with the ground of it, then there could have been nothing to be

changed. Change then is logically necessary only for the finite. Physically, it seems to be within a self-identical system. There is according to science an ultimate ground of permanence in the universe, which *becomes* in all its parts. What changes, is not substance but meaning. So it may be held in the moral sphere, not unintelligibly, that the ultimate ground of progressive ideals is a permanent and perfect ideal. This ideal may conceivably be ours to the extent of the lights in which we learn to see it, and according to the meanings which we may become able to attribute to it. And again, the underlying permanence of the universe need not be dead, nor the *summum bonum* motionless; but it may be coming towards realisation in the finite, and this realisation may be conceived less as dull satisfaction than perfected activity.

From this point of view the perfect or Platonic idea, to which Herbartian educators may logically turn, may have an objective and real validity, and may be the standard to which concrete individuals approximate. The "concept" boy may be a real far off, divine event. Then the progressive ideals that are dear to the educator "by development" may be regarded as the filtrations of eternal truths, whose "white radiance" is in part disguised in the medium of life, as by "a dome of many-colored glass." And so this attempt at an ethical and educational synthesis may be offered, that although the immediate concern of the educator is with the "percept" or individual child of Froebel, he should cling to the belief that the "percept" child is a "concept" or universal child at heart. It may be added, that so far as class instruction in the schools is collective, it is addressed necessarily to the "concept" child. Herbartianism has contributed much that is valuable to the principles of class teaching,¹ without recognising so fully as does the kindergarten the worth of the individual. But the synthesis of collective and individual teaching is hardly to be summarised in an abstract phrase; it consists in the dynamic concrete readjustment, by the teacher, of the emphasis in given situations.

¹Cf. e. g. Findlay, *Principles of Class Teaching*, London, 1904. *passim*.

The ethical reconciliation of being and becoming, or of perfect and dynamic ideals, may suggest for those who are willing to accept it a similar *modus vivendi* in ontology. It may be argued that the fundamental problem in this branch of metaphysic is causation. Something is, and something happens; and causation, if it exist, is that which connects the thing that is and the thing that happens. But the preceding discussion of being and becoming seems to suggest that evolution may be a more helpful category than causation. For causation is a highly contradictory category. It must be continuous, and yet continuity appears to annihilate the distinction between cause and effect. Again, cause must be and yet cannot be prior in time to effect. It involves an indefinite regress from cause to cause *ad infinitum*. Practically, causes are treated as a plurality, and yet the notion of a plurality of causes is logically absurd.¹ Apparently then the most tenable view of change and of causation is that in which the category of evolution is involved. In short, there is need of a permanence to give an aspect of continuity, simultaneity, and unity to causation, as well as a newness which gives it an aspect of change, temporal sequence and plurality. Apparently it is the element of permanence in change and causation which lies at the root of the ontology of Herbartian realism. The other element, qualitative change, is, except in certain closed and dogmatic systems, a principle of idealistic ontology. It should follow that even the metaphysical theories of Herbart and Froebel need not be wholly excluded from the synthesis of an evolutionary theory of reality, teleologically interpreted. The permanent being of Herbart, and the becoming of Froebel, seem to be abstracted aspects of this more concrete principle. But the suggestions for a synthesis in this section are confessedly speculative.

5. *Intellectualism and voluntarism.* In the field of ethics, the opposition of Herbart and Froebel may be illustrated not only in relation to the problems of freedom and the ideal, but also in relation to the question of how to educate character. It is true that Herbart no less than Froebel aims at the good will as the end of education. Since Kant, repeats

¹Cf. *The Elements of Metaphysics*. A. E. Taylor. London, 1903.

Herbart, nothing else can be called good but the good will.¹ Character then is the thing desired. Notwithstanding, within this consensus, it would appear that Herbart and Froebel respectively emphasise intellect and feeling. If now the intellect and feeling be set obstinately over against one another, or if the will be regarded as a third coordinate factor with them, and no more, then there does not seem to be a tenable ground for a synthesis. But it is perhaps preferable to regard feeling and intellect as the content of the mind at a given plane of intersection. Then the will is the mind in action, or in the exercise of its function of controlling experience. From this point of view, thought as distinguished from feeling will refer to the focus of mental strain; and the marginal element in consciousness will be present essentially as feeling. Such a psychological analysis may pave the way for a synthesis of the emphasis of Herbart upon thought with the emphasis laid by Froebel upon feeling. The psychological ground of the synthesis will be, that the mind is only concrete as will; that thinking is teleologically conditioned with reference to willing, or more simply, that it functions as a means to the control of activities; and that feeling may be regarded as a dynamo, which provides a "head" or motive power for thought and action.

For Herbart the will depends upon ideas, which in turn are externally provided. Herbart experienced a difficulty in reconciling the determinism of this hypothesis with the moral sanction of personal responsibility. In order to escape from this dilemma he advanced a doctrine as it were of two wills. He distinguished sharply between character as objective and as subjective.² The will before reflection differs from the will after reflection. In accordance with this change, educational methodology has to effect a transition from the appeal to external control to a reliance upon inner self-discipline.³ In a word, the will before reflection is determined; after reflection, free. The self before reflection is a product; after it, an agent. The distinction is not only significant; but within limits acceptable. But by what magic

¹Herbart refers to Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*. Section 1.

²*Cf.* *Pad. Schrift.* hrsg. Willman. Leipzig, 1880. II. pp. 457-8.

³*Ibid.* II. p. 524.

can there be a transition from a *purely* objective to a subjective will? Can freedom and self-control rest upon a basis of mere determinism? Nay, one is compelled to answer, the objective will must have contained in itself the implicit principle of selfhood. But this is evolutionary idealism, and not the philosophy of Herbart.

The contradiction that is involved in a rigid distinction between the subjective will and the objective will is reflected in Herbartian educational theory. Herbart himself attacked only transcendental freedom; and not inner freedom or freedom in general.¹ But the educator *qua* educator is to be a determinist. "The freedom principle," writes Hayward, "sounds well in university class-rooms, and may, indeed, represent a fundamental philosophical truth; but as an educational maxim it is useless if not pernicious." And again: "We must be, in so far as we are educators, determinists."² But for Froebel, education is a process of liberation, and even of the exercise of freedom or selfactivity. The notion that freedom may be a fundamental truth, and yet obnoxious in education, is worthy of a science of casuistry. But the Herbartian who is willing to admit, in the objective will, an implicit principle of conscious self-control, is virtually on the way to the suggested teleological and evolutionary synthesis.

The relation of the will to thought and feeling was differently conceived by Herbart and by Froebel. Herbart as well as Froebel would have the child to be an active agent.³ For Herbart: "Action generates the will out of desire."⁴ Action, that is, is the immediate ancestor of the will; but action itself depends upon desire, which in the Herbartian psychology is essentially a product of ideas. Herbart adds: "But capacity and opportunity are necessary to action."² To this Froebel would have agreed, though he might have wished to add that action is a factor even in the making of opportunities. For Herbart, thought is essentially prior to action; for Froebel, action is rather prior to thought. Her-

¹*Pädagogische Schriften.* (Sallwürk). II. p. 227. Note.

²*The Secret of Herbart.* 1904. p. 30.

³*Pädagogische Schriften.* [Sallwürk]. I. pp. 233-4. Or see Felkin, *The Science of Education*, p. 210.

⁴*Ibid.* I. p. 228.

bart practically deduced the will out of thought through desire. Froebel, on the other hand, proceeded from inner desire to thought by way of action and will. So far as Herbart may over-emphasise ideas, or Froebel feeling, in relation to will, a synthesis has already been suggested. For the will has been regarded as the concrete and dynamic mind of which intellect and feeling are sectional phases.

From the point of view of an evolution interpreted in the light of ideals, the synthesis may be somewhat differently expressed. Feeling then appears to constitute the terminus of origin, and selfconscious activity to characterise the goal. Feeling and thought are then not opposites but co-laborers in personal activity. In the evolution from mere feeling to a higher form of self-consciousness, feeling, as motive power, is not lost; but persists along with thought, the guiding hand. But evolutionary idealism may suggest a synthesis that runs deeper still. It may suggest, on the side of origin, that thought can only have arisen out of a feeling whose ultimate nature and basis is rational. And again, the thought that enters into the goal of feeling, while it does not eradicate sense, really does attempt to reorganise sense upon a higher plane. So the naturalness, the sympathy of Froebel may be reconciled with the clear mental vision of Herbart. If both reason and feeling function in activity, then reason is not for the elimination of feelings, or even of passions; but rather for their location, adaptation and control.

6. *The education of character.* The intellectualism of Herbartian, the voluntarism of Froebelian education aim alike at the goal of character. But if there be any validity in the Aristotelian distinction between goodness of intellect and goodness of character, of which the former is declared to be of time and teaching, and the latter of habit, then Herbart and Froebel may be said to respectively represent these abstract terms of the mental series. Herbart represents goodness of intellect, and the formative aspect of time and teaching upon such goodness. Froebel represents goodness of character, born of the habit of moral activity. This goodness is equally amenable to education, so far as education is content with the guidance of inner activities, though it is of a kind liable to rebel against dogmatism. But the anti-

thesis is imperfect, and largely a tribute to emphasis. Perhaps so far as one may look at goodness in a quasi-Platonic way, that is to say, as an intellectual possession, it is Herbart who indicates how education may promote it. But, when the question is of the good in use, or when one's attitude is Aristotelian, then Froebel may become the more helpful. Herbart, regarding the mind as it were in cross section, justly emphasises the ethical import of the mental content which a cross section appears to reveal; just as Froebel, seeing the mind as process, prefers to lay stress upon the tenor of its activities. Herbart may be right to the extent that even a transcendental will can hardly act without a content; Froebel to the degree that no content, which is merely a content, or merely objective, can possibly give birth to a subject mind.

If indeed the case stand so, then Herbart and Froebel may correct one another where there is direst need of rectification. Herbart has contributed to moral teaching an emphasis upon the power of ideas in the making of character.¹ It may also be well that he should have treated morality as a thing not given, but produced in the process of living. And yet, each time that the educator would put into practice the recipe of Herbart for man-making, let Froebel remind him that he is dealing with a personality having potentialities as unfathomable as his own. If the educator can establish no sympathetic communion with this cognate will, his house of moral instruction is built on a foundation no better than sand.

¹Cf. *Pädagogische Schriften*. (Sallwürk). pp. 114-5.

CHAPTER IV.

AN ATTEMPT AT AN EDUCATIONAL SYNTHESIS.

In the course of the preceding chapters, attempts have been made to anticipate to a degree the synthesis of Herbart and Froebel in the field of education. And chiefly, the problem of the education of character, the problem of freedom in education, and the problem of the nature and possibility of knowledge have received explicit attention. It now appears to be necessary to devote a chapter to the synthetic treatment of more technical educational categories.

1. *Society and the curriculum.* Both for Herbart and for Froebel, the curriculum is a system of social values. By its agency, or rather by the agency of the process of education to which it ministers, the individual is to be socialised. In a relatively static society, such as that of the Chinese tradition, the attempt may be made to promote an adjustment of the individual to his environment with a finality that is foreign to the spirit of western civilisation. But in a democracy, the curriculum will be formulated with the aim of adjusting individuals to social *ideals* rather than to any state of society that has been fully actualised. It will be in a manner sensitive to the progressive reorganisation of individual and social functions. Its value will be to promote cooperation, the possibility of an adequate specialisation of functions, and the due relation of the theoretical to the practical life. Its tendency is to divide into two sections, of which the sciences, industries, and sundry processes form one, and that the democratic section, while the humanities form the other section, which tends to be intellectual and aristocratic. The Herbartian tendency is to emphasise the latter aspect of the curriculum. The Froebelian bias, at least in the occupations and gifts, is rather towards processes. But a synthesis may be conceived, wherein the humanities may become practical, and science and the manual arts *human*. Indeed it would appear that for a synthetic educational system art and industry, or rather the cultural and

the occupational side of the curriculum, represented in a way by Herbart and Froebel respectively, should go hand in hand. There are obvious anticipations of this view in Ruskin and Morris, and in the whole movement of the *arts and crafts*.

Herbart appears to draw nearer than Froebel to the common-sense view of education, as the attempt to get a curriculum of facts into the minds of the less mature members of society. The element of truth in this view may be the principle, that the curriculum is not *according to nature* in any primitive or original sense; but rather according to culture, or civilisation, or if you will, nature teleologically interpreted. The Herbartian analysis of the curriculum is distinctively cultural. Indeed, the followers of Herbart have relied so much upon the achievements of the race, that in their anxiety to recapitulate these achievements, in extreme cases they have almost closed their eyes to the necessity for further progress. For epochs of culture can tell of little more than historic fact, so far as even this is known; and value can only be attributed to such fact in the light of the needs and aspirations of the present day. Not only Herbart but Froebel also has the social ideal. It will be indicated that Froebel, for his part, may at times have wavered between the standards of civilisation and original nature, and so between the normative and genetic methods. He may have been justified in his many concessions to original nature, to the extent that education is a process of the liberation as well as the guidance of the human spirit. At least, so far as Froebel may have emphasised original activities, and Herbart cultural values, the following adjustment of emphasis may be offered. Genetic method may criticise, illustrate, amplify, and interpret; but only out of civilisation are born the fundamental standards of the valuable. The genetic method is itself unintelligible apart from a supplementary reflux of light from the zone of adult achievement.

It may be desirable to add, that to a certain degree both Herbart and Froebel attained to the reconciliation of a normative with a genetic methodology. The method of Froebel may be said to have been the guidance of a socialising process, by means of material drawn from what the child

at each successive stage of his development may be able to see as at unity with himself. The criterion of Herbart may be even more normative, and less genetic; yet these two aspects may be discriminated also in it. It is the body of racial experience, therefore an ulterior end; and yet this end is to be attained by a sort of genetic process of the recapitulation of culture epochs. Thus both Herbart and Froebel have attempted, each in his own way, to reconcile genesis with aim.

2. *Educational values.* The school of Herbart represents to a degree a theory of the gradation of culture values. It sets for example the humanities above the study of nature. There appears to be a species of validity in the stress upon culture, which man has achieved, over against such a nature, say, as Rousseau had posited in his curriculum for the education of Emile. Yet ultimately the sciences, which some have opposed to culture as if they were original and given truths of nature, are as truly human achievements as the humanities.

With Froebel, nature might seem to be preferred above culture. But his standard of value in the occupations and gifts is social. And, even were this not so, his spiritual interpretation of nature would bestow a human significance upon the study of it. Thus the possibility of a reconciliation between Herbart and Froebel is suggested. But what form shall the synthesis take? Have all subjects of the curriculum, rightly methodised, an equal educational value? Not so, if *equal* means the same, and any other sense of the word is here unintelligible. Manual training, however treated, can hardly have *the same* educational value as poetry. Rather, for practical purposes, their values are not wholly commensurable. But the following suggestion for a synthesis endeavours to allow for what is valid in the views of both Herbart and Froebel. It seeks to preserve the theory of Herbart, that the subjects of the curriculum have different and graded values, without a denial of Froebel's principle of the essential unity of man and nature. The suggestion is this, that while there are subjects in the curriculum which possess specialised and to a degree graded values, yet the very existence of these subjects is determined by human

needs. Thus the values of the subjects of the curriculum are not the creation of independent compartments of original fact. They are indeed determined by the indispensableness of the relationships that may be established between the ideal set up by society, and the needs and aspirations of the individual life. Then, if this be so, the subjects of the school curriculum are logical divisions imposed by the social spirit upon the material of knowledge for the realisation of human purposes. The value of a school subject is essentially the extent to which it may be made to minister to those purposes.

3. *Correlation and concentration.* Just as the subjects of the curriculum are related as to their value by a common reference to human purposes, so it seems reasonable to correlate them as to their content in the process of teaching. Correlation is one of the practical recommendations of the school of Herbart. Froebel also related the activities of the child to a central object; but correlation is not the same conception with Froebel as with Herbart. (For Herbart, correlation is based upon a theory of association of ideas in the individual mind.) That the life of thought be not sporadic, ideas must be associated according to a process directed by the teacher from without. Without instruction to complete the organisation of ideas, the house of thought, and thence of will, might be divided against itself so that it could not stand. To Froebel, however, correlation is just the recognition of the fundamental oneness of the individual with society. For the curriculum is a systematised summary of civilisation, held in the social medium. The individual, however, is in purpose and function social. Correlation, then, is from this point of view a process of carrying over the inward unity of the self to the field of its manifestation or liberation. Froebel's is perhaps the truer notion of correlation, in that correlation is not of and among externals, but of social norms and the individual life. Even so, Herbart has done more than Froebel, on the technical side, for the recognition of correlation as a principle. To the extent of the validity of his psychology of the blendings and fusions of ideas he has given an invaluable account of its educational functions. It is not to be forgotten that the curriculum itself exists in a medium of thought, that thought

to be worthy of the name must be organised and vital, and that in the curriculum must be preserved at once the vitality, the reality of the outer world, and of the child also. The correlation which tends to externality, including that which forms the essence of the Herbartian methodology, has to be fitted together with the methodology of the little child. Probably indeed the feasibility of so delicate a task may hinge upon an hereditary harmony of the child with society.

So far as *concentration* means technically a particular variety of correlation, it is opposed in principle to the *co-ordination* of a number of equivalent groups. In concentration there is one main topic about which others are grouped. In co-ordination there may be a number of such topics, as with Dr. Harris, five.¹ Froebel's correlation is of the concentric type; now all centers about the ball, and anon about another and yet another gift or occupation. Perhaps there is something lacking about almost all formulations of the principle of correlation. Even that which relates the school to life,² and reflects the life unity in the school curriculum, may be open to misinterpretation. For it would seem that the true life unity is an ideal or teleological unity; and that the true correlation is not after all a mere unity of reference to the life of the moment, so much as a unity of application in a system of ends.

4. *The formal steps of method.* Thus far, little has been said of method as such. At the same time, it has been suggested that curriculum and method are after all the same thing considered in different aspects. The curriculum is an organisation of civilisation, an institutional affair. Like all institutions, it is therefore in essence a method. Institutions are the methods through and in which society conveys to individuals its social norms. The curriculum may be viewed as such a means or method. It seems to follow that the current distinction between curriculum and method can only refer to a given something viewed statically or habitually, and the same thing viewed dynamically. Method, if you will, is dynamic curriculum. Curriculum itself is crystallised method.

¹*Psychological Foundations of Education.* In *International Education Series.* p. 323.

²*Cf. The School and Society.* Dewey. p. 107.

A serious consequence of the stated relation of matter to method is that no formal method should aspire to universal validity. For if method be the subject matter as dynamic, it cannot be uniform, unless the subject matter be so. Yet modern Herbartians tend to assume a uniformity of method in educational operations. For instance, they would begin each set recitation with a period of review, according to the routine engendered by the mechanical tendency of a psychology of mere associationism. It might be more scientific in principle to regulate reviews by the demands of the particular situation. The function of reviews may be less to secure knowledge, or clearness, than power. In that case, the ultimate criterion of the necessity of reviews may be the need of energising an achieved mental content.

This illustration may suggest a further argument against the uniformity of the method of the recitation. The first argument was, that method cannot be uniform, because it is dynamic subject matter, and subject matter is not uniform. Now by *dynamic* subject matter is meant, the curriculum as functioning with the mind of the child. Two causes evidently preclude the uniformity of this functioning. In the first place, as has been said, the subject matter varies; and in the second place the mind of the child varies. Method ought then to concede somewhat to individuality; for to make it uniform is to explain away something of the concreteness of life.

Finally, it is to be said of the five formal steps that ultimately they are not logical divisions of a lesson period so much as principles of a psychological process. Clearness, association, system and method¹ are types of mental activity, although even as such it is difficult to regard them as at all uniform or final.

It may not be clear that what has been said of the formal steps has much to do with a synthesis of Herbart and Froebel. But the individual psychology of Froebel, his endeavour to get at the inner life of each child, makes as decisively for diversity of method, as the more mechanical psychology of Herbart makes for uniformity. And something like a

¹Herbart, *Pädagogische Schriften*. Sallwürk. I. p. 157.

synthesis has been indicated, inasmuch as the formal steps of the school of Herbart are valid, to the extent that they may be seen to assist, in many concrete cases, the functioning together of the curriculum and the child. But this will neither uniformly nor always be the case, according to the principles of the foregoing analysis.

5. *The theory of culture epochs.* What has been said of the formal steps of method may suggest some remarks upon the formal theory of epochs of culture. Apparently, the child comes to school with a system of needs, conditioned by a genetic process through which he has inherited his civilised estate. This thought has led to such conclusions, as that the child is to run rapidly yet freely through recapitulatory stages about which hangs the aroma of a past of primitivism, perhaps even of arboreal and piscatorial life. Early childhood has been regarded as a period in which these phases of origin may be worked out and worked off, especially in play. Play in this sense, as spontaneous, is opposed to work. This antithesis is at variance with Froebel's thought of play, that it is, or should be, an anticipation of social function. Without doubt the child mind is apt to behave in a manner that suggests many typical primitive activities. If this be an evolutionary recurrence, or any kind of atavistic phenomenon, it is probably more desirable to guide such manifestations than to obstruct them. For recapitulatory activities that are in line with social evolution may be expected to be amenable to a measure of social control.

The older Herbartians used to dogmatise about culture epochs, lacking either a standard of value for the alleged primitive activities, an analysis of what these may really be, a reasonable historical perspective of the order of their recurrence, or a notion of where to begin or end with them. Should one begin with, or educate for, the aquatic stage, if ever one existed? Or should education first take cognisance of simian activities, or those of primitive man; or if first of the latter, of what kind or stage of him? According to Sallwürk, the error of Ziller, Staude and Rein is that they have omitted to establish a real correspondence between individual and racial development. "Lack of the historic

sense is above all a characteristic of the Zillerian school."¹ But though the fact of correspondence be admitted, it affords no standard of educational values. It becomes for education a mere emphasis on the significance of impulses as such, apart from their quality, and apart from their desirability. Indeed, it may also be held to affect the order in which parts of the curriculum should be presented to the child. But the question of the priority of subject to subject in time appears to be in part determined by the interests appealed to and the methods employed.

It might be possible for Herbart and Froebel to agree that genetic epochs of culture matter to education only at second hand. That is to say, even if the historic culture of the race were fully known and understood, its worth would have to be estimated in terms of the standards erected by modern intelligence. For example, the hunting instinct as such is not to be cultivated merely because at one time it may have been vital to human subsistence. It is only to be cultivated in so far as the hunting activity retains a value in the present constitution of society. And so, just as Froebel appreciated play not merely as impulse, but also as something implicitly social, Herbart may have really emphasised the *Odyssey* less for its mere priority in human experience than for its social value. Thus it does not seem impossible to reconcile what is reasonable in a theory of epochs of culture, and the recapitulation of them, with twentieth century standards of worth.

6. *Technique*. The formal steps, and certain "culture epoch" curricula, are among the indications of the strength of Herbartianism on the side of technique. This does not appear to be accidental, but a natural consequence of the Herbartian tendency to centralise the education process rather as it were in the teacher than the child.² Herbart himself, it is true, did not emphasise technicalities so much as his school has done. "I am not such a fool," he wrote, "as to imagine that the salvation of mankind depends on such trifling aids, which may more or less lighten the burden of instruction."³

¹Sallwürk. *Handel und Wandel der Pädagogischen Schule Herbarts*. Langensalza, 1885, p. 39.

²Cf. *Pädagogische Schriften*. hrsg. Sallwürk, I. p. 183. Or Felkin, *Science of Education*. Boston 1902. p. 150.

³*Pädagogische Schriften*. hrsg. Sallwürk. I. p. 183.

Yet the mathematical and mechanical bias of the psychology of Herbart has lent itself to a high degree of technical elaboration. Froebel, for his part, seems to care less for technique than for the spirit of instruction. For him, the mother is the queen of teachers. It is quite a question whether indeed the teacher should rely more upon settled devices, or upon initiative, charged as it should perhaps be from the dynamo of feeling. The teacher of zeal and enthusiasm may make his curriculum dynamic, and therefore self-methodising. On the other hand, mere enthusiasm without technique is lacking in economy. If it be conceivable that the very science, the very technique, the very habit of education may be informed by passion, then in such a temper do I conceive the reconciliation of the spirit of Herbart and Froebel to lie. According to this view, formal devices, formal methods, are apt to be valuable in proportion as they are or become the teacher's own. They need to be energised and animated by an adequate force of will and feeling.

7. *Instruction.* For Froebel, the activities of the child appear to regulate the method of instruction. But, according to Herbart, it is better to leave method in the hands of the teacher. There is a sense in which one cannot but adopt the view of Herbart. The teacher, not the child, reflects upon the method of instruction; therefore the teacher, not the child, is able to control it. Moreover, Herbart believed as fully as Froebel that the teacher should defer in his instruction to psychological modes of activity. But Herbart conceived these modes differently from Froebel. For Herbart they were mathematical, for Froebel rather "divine;" for Herbart typical, for Froebel individual; for Herbart plastic, for Froebel to a degree elastic. Now if the mind be mathematical, uniform and plastic, it is clear that instruction will be for education, like motley for Jacques, "the only wear." "I admit," confessed Herbart, "having no notion of education without instruction, just as conversely I can imagine no instruction that does not educate."¹

But for Froebel education is as much by appetite as instruction. It is not, as it is with Herbart,² a process of

¹*Allgemeine Pädagogik.* X. Par. II.

²*Pädagogische Schriften.* hrsg. Sallwürk. I. p. 210. Or Felkin, *Science of Education.* Boston, 1902. p. 192.

filling the mind from without. For the child cries out for education. In a certain sense, and from a certain point of view, the child is his own instructor. It may not be difficult to reconcile in some measure this mode of emphasis upon inner activity with the emphasis of Herbart upon instruction. Writers like Linde have conceived a synthetic "developing-presentative method."¹ The problem may resolve itself into this form: does the environment fashion the child, or the child the environment? If the former, then education is instruction merely; if the latter, it resembles the development of a Leibnitzian monad, as a process moving entirely from within outward. But in this extreme form neither hypothesis is tenable. If life be of the nature of an interaction of organism with environment, then neither can be ultimately conceived as static. In fact, the environment unbends to the child, and so far as may be accommodates itself to him, from birth to maturity. Conceive education then as interaction; and the antithesis between instruction, and development from within, loses its absolute character. For the teacher will still instruct, without depriving the child of freedom. He will not create men according to his will, as Herbart would almost suggest,² neither will he abstain from interference with "nature." But his function, in a word, will be guidance. The possibility of guidance may depend upon the communion which the teacher enjoys on the one hand with the child, and on the other hand with the environment with which the child interacts. In any case, into guidance there enter two factors, whether we know them as nature and culture, or origin and value, or the child and the curriculum, or the individual and society. To emphasise the former in each pair of categories is to emphasise freedom; to lay stress upon the latter in each case indicates pre-occupation with control. Freedom is perhaps the more Froebelian principle; but into it enters social control. Control is the message of Herbart; but freedom is smuggled into it through the gate of interest. In a synthesis, what is needed appears to be a redistribution of the balance of emphasis. Such a redistribution may be suggested by the term *guidance*.

¹Cf. Linde, *Der darstellende Unterricht*, p. 49.

²Cf. e. g. *Pädagogische Schriften*. Sallwürk. I. p. 173.

It is true that guidance is interference; but it is not so much interference *with* activities, as interference *for* activities.

8. *Education for vocation.* Herbart and Froebel are agreed that the purpose of instruction is to promote character. But it is desirable to give to character a very definite content. For instance, is character a possession of the individual, or the mode of his functioning? In concrete cases this question generally takes a narrower form. Is education, in the narrower sense of the word, cultural; or is it essentially vocational? Thus on the one hand, some culture seems due to the individual as the birthright of his manhood. If man has a higher nature, higher possibilities, it is ultimately for these possibilities and for this nature that education is. Herbart therefore felt that education should produce many-sided and cultured men. Education, he said, does not work for the calling, the vocation, in life.¹ But everything depends upon the interpretation of *vocation* so-called. With Froebel, education is for vocation, but not for any trade or superficial occupation merely. Vocation according to Froebel is a "divine" calling to make the best of one's possibilities. But vocation in this ethical sense is not inconsistent with the Herbartian definition of the end of education. The difference is perhaps this, that for Herbart it is an outer voice that calls; an inner voice for Froebel. And again, the principles of Froebel, unlike those of Herbart, are not very definitely opposed to education for vocation in the more utilitarian sense. The soul, thought Froebel, can find freedom and realisation not only in history, and literature, and mathematics, but again in the trivial round of daily opportunity.

Indeed, in a modern society there needs to be education for specialised function. For consider society as a membership, or as an organism, if "organism" be interpreted not merely on a biological plane, but psychically. Society then appears to be a "vicarious" system, an association of men to bear one another's burdens, an organisation of innumerable functions, an attempt at an equilibration of many differentiated occupations and pursuits. This is the character of society in Plato's ideal republic, where men are to be counsellors, artists, soldiers, according to innate fitness and

¹*Pädagogische Schriften.* (Sallwürk). I. p. 233.

public training. It persists not only in ideal communities, such as More's *Utopia* and the *New Atlantis* of Bacon; but in all historical societies and states, in republics, monarchies, oligarchies, and conspicuously in feudal organisations. In certain respects regard for the highly specialised organism of twentieth century society appears likely to swell the cry for an education for vocation to an irresistible clamor. Science has already been forced into the curriculum by social needs, so that the *literae humaniores* are no longer without a rival. Manual training is said to have many values; but perhaps ultimately it is in an industrial bias that its strength in public opinion lies. Indeed, the two facts that have done more than anything else to establish a vocational emphasis in education are probably the development of public opinion as a social force and the industrial character of the present age. Industry has strong claims upon the patience if not devotion of an educator. It has come to color the literature, the science, the art, the politics, and the whole life of the present. It has reorganised society on a commercial basis. It has made factories instead of families the units of work. It has made actual a broad culture and a high standard of luxury such as were previously only possible to the limited few. It may soon afford to all workers an unprecedented margin of leisure. It would seem therefore to be a social duty to educate for the transmission and development of the processes of industry that have done so much for the higher values of life, and may do so much more. And, again, the case for industry is *prima facie* a case for vocational training, if only because specialised vocational functioning is the chief principle of the organisation of modern industrial development.

Therefore, at the present day, one dare hardly sever education from vocation so sharply as did Herbart. Herbartians may be fundamentally right in attributing, say to the *Odyssey*, a greater culture value than to manual training. And yet, Greek is only for the few, and if manual training be culturally treated, it may be possible to atone for a conceivable loss in intensity by the wider extension of educational influence. Such a plea, did they stand in need of it, might also justify the place of nature study and science in the school cur-

riculum. The vocational, the industrial, tends to be scientific and physical. The aim of the teacher then will be, to humanise science and to idealise nature. So far as this may be done, Herbart and Froebel at their best are reconciled. For now, first, in industrial training there will be a basis for ultimate vocational efficiency. Second, in its idealisation, there will be a foundation for reconciling the work with the personality. Third, in industrial training *for all*, there will be laid the groundwork of a social sympathy even between classes whose interests at present almost lack a point of contact. Fourth, the traditions of a democratic society will be so far respected, that without abandoning the notion that each man has a place, the set and rigid distinctions of a caste system may be avoided, and the opportunity be left to each individual to make a place for himself according to the potentialities of his nature and the quality of his energies.

II.

Thus far, the attempt has been made in this chapter to indicate the possibility of a synthesis of Herbart and Froebel in the direction of curriculum and method. Without altogether forsaking these topics, the second part of the chapter will center about the traditional opposition of nature and culture. In a sense, Froebel stands for the emphasis upon nature; and Herbart for the emphasis upon culture. Is it possible to reconcile the principle of education according to nature with that of education for an institutional life?

I. *Nature and civilisation.* Rousseau appears to have mistaken the stagnancy of the institutions of his day for sheer degeneracy. He even came to consider civilisation as a fall from a better and happier state of nature. To him, then, it logically seemed better for education to follow nature rather than to follow civilisation. Thus for Emile, at least so far as common sense would tolerate such a doctrine, instincts and tendencies were to be everything, curriculum nothing. Back to nature lay the path of man. This note helped to stir Lessing and Herder, Kant and Pestalozzi, Goethe and Schiller, Froebel and Herbart. It tended to liberate thought and to emphasise feeling. With Pestalozzi

it found part and lot in educational theory and practice. Following nature, becoming a child with the child, is one aspect of the doctrine of Froebel. But to Froebel and Pestalozzi there was no ultimate opposition between nature and culture. Herbart was even convinced that culture or civilisation is prior to nature in education. He may be said to have led a distinct reaction against the educational views of Rousseau. "To leave man to nature, or even to wish to lead him to, and train him up in, nature, is mere folly. . . . We know our aim, nature does much to aid us, and humanity has gathered much on the road she has already traversed; it is our task to pin them together."¹ But before we proceed to pin them together, there is a question to be answered. What is nature? There is perhaps no other category so ambiguous. At the least, the following senses of the term are distinguishable and vital to the present topic. To the scientist, nature is an externality to be accurately described. To the poet, nature is a background to human emotion. To the idealist, nature is the expression of spirit or reason. To Rousseauists, nature is primitivism or origin. And to the moralist, nature is that which ought to be. To Froebel nature tends to mean a sort of combination of all of these. In the last analysis, as nature is to him something social and divine, he is not very far from Herbart.

The opposition of nature and culture is sometimes expressed as an opposition of heredity and environment, or nature and nurture. In Huxley and Matthew Arnold the antithesis, nature *versus* culture, leads to a respective emphasis upon the sciences and the humanities as factors in the educational curriculum. "The distinctive character of our own times," said Huxley, "lies in the vast and constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge."² And again: "For all those who mean to make science their serious occupation; or who intend to follow the profession of medicine; or who have to enter early upon the business of life; for all these, in my opinion, classical education is a mistake."³ This reads not unlike a criticism of the type of curriculum suggested by Herbart. It raises the question, for instance,

¹*Pädagogische Schriften* [Sallwürk]. I. p. 164.

²*Science and Culture*. New York, 1888. p. 21.

³*Ibid.* p. 23.

whether the Odyssey is a suitable center for a modern curriculum. Its reality is not quite a modern reality. Froebel, for his part, preferred to begin with the near at hand.¹ He seemed to prefer, even in song and story, an idealised actuality to an imported mythology. But over against Huxley, Matthew Arnold has a word to add on behalf of culture. What, he asks, is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, forfeit himself?² For nature is indeed what he works from and with, but dare he neglect art and literature, or the wealth of emotional exercise in poetry and eloquence? Even for the sake of science, it cannot be.

Synthetically then, the educator will endeavour to find nature in culture, and culture in nature. He will seek to combine nature and culture, if not like Froebel in a poetic or romantic way, then like Herbart in a reasonable confidence that the achievements of the race, which constitute the objects of culture, are in the truest sense, *natural*. In education, nature is to be civilised, humanised, idealised; and culture is not to be confounded with artificiality, or attributed merely to one selected kind of subject matter. The knowledge for the sake of knowledge of the scientist, the art for art's sake of the humanist, are for education, if taken alone and of themselves, equally inadequate categories. There could only be an ultimate antinomy between nature and culture if by some means an individual were born outside of society, and suddenly dragged within it.

2. *Education by institutions.* Although culture is ultimately an appeal to social values, mere literary culture is not socialisation. For this reason Herbart, with all his appreciation of literature, conceived a less social process of education than did Froebel. He did not care primarily for educational institutions; but even retained a preference for individual tuition. But for Froebel, the school was institutional. It was an evolution out of the home and vocation. Especially in the *Mother Plays* are there many glimpses of an adapted institutionalism.³ The institution of the kindergarten was looked upon by Froebel less as a private enterprise than a permanent social factor contributing to the

¹Cf. e. g. *Pedagogics of the Kindergarten*. New York, 1895. p. 22.

²Cf. *Discourses in America*. London, 1889. *Literature and Science*.

³Cf. e. g. *Der kleine Zeichner*.

higher life of the German people. In a speech made in his old age at the opening of the first Burghers' Kindergarten in Hamburg, Froebel never once abandoned "the thought of a uniting education satisfying the individual in all his relations."¹ But with the Herbartians, and notably Ziller, there is no such emphasis upon the needs of the social whole.² And again, the desperate endeavours of Froebel to found educational institutions had no parallel with Herbart himself.

From one point of view, the several basic institutions, including the home, the school, the state, the vocation and the church, are methods by which society conveys to individuals an adaptative and controlling power in experience. Through institutions, again, individuals are admitted into partnership with larger social groups. But although institutions have these general functions in common, their offices in the social economy are in a measure delimited. The state, indeed, has a station among them that is legally rather than actually unique. On paper the state is omnipotent. In a way it supervises the endeavours of its fellow institutions, and is the residuary legatee of such of their functions as remain unfulfilled. In this way certain states and cities are coming to employ the kindergarten to supplement the deficiencies of educational influences in the family. This is wholly in the spirit of Pestalozzi and Froebel. "You shall do for your children what their parents fail to do for them," are the words of Gertrude to the schoolmaster.³ "The primary, indispensable requisite of education at this period," wrote Froebel, "is the union of the school and the family."⁴ But unto Herbartians, for whom the teacher rather creates than trains the mind, the family is a disturbing element. At this day, many scientific teachers, whose inclinations are Herbartian, look upon the parents of their pupils as interlopers in the work of education. Perhaps, if education were for culture merely, or for the individual merely, then the teacher would be its absolute center, and the pedagogical works of Herbart might be its sufficient book of method.

¹Cf. *The Third Volume of Froebel's Pedagogics*. 1904. Translated by Josephine Jarvis. p. 18.

²Cf. *Pädagogische Strömungen an der Wende des Jahrhunderts im Gebiete der Volksschule*. Hanschmann, Leipzig, 1896. p. 36.

³See Pestalozzi, *Leonard and Gertrude*. In *Educational Classics*. p. 118.

⁴*Menschen Erziehung*. hrsg. Seidel. 1883. p. 161.

But if education be rather for socialisation than individual accomplishment, then the home, or the spirit of the home, is still as central as it was for Froebel. This distinction to a degree conveys a synthesis, if it should suggest that the educator may seek to guide the moving balance of scholastic and domestic functions.

3. *Individuality.* In so far as it is consistent with the psychology of Herbart, education is wholly a process of control. It cannot be conceived apart from instruction. It is as it were the manipulation of clay by the hand of a sculptor of men. It is a process motivated from without. It is the study of a philosopher or a scientist, rather than a mutual commerce of satisfactions, in which the child repays the adult in full measure for the boon of his own socialisation. Unlike Froebel, Herbart could not consistently value education as a reciprocal process in which the privilege is partly on the side of the adult. One result of this difference in attitude between Herbart and Froebel is that Froebel had a more vivid intuition of the worth of the individual. But it has been already urged that Herbartian education tends to individualism by virtue of its intellectual leanings. Individualism, however, is not individuality. Individuality is a social matter. One cannot be individual without being social, inasmuch as it is only the process of socialisation which confers that harmony with environment which is the essential condition of freedom. But according to an Herbartian psychology, education makes not only for sociality but for uniformity. It makes for a set type of sociality, many-sidedness. The psychology of Froebel, on the other hand, by attributing to the soul an original character, admits of greater concessions to brotherly dissimilarities and varying degrees of hereditary capacity. The social chord is to sound in harmony; not in mere unison. But it may be that Froebel tends to overestimate the power of freedom which resides in the individual. For although, as Froebel in effect maintained, the individual is not to be regarded as the product of facts which are foreign to his own spirit, neither is he so far aloof from the facts of experience as to be utterly independent of laws of causation. Therefore, in the attempt to synthesise the views of Herbart and Froebel that concern

individuality, the educator will need to bring together the emphasis of Herbart upon causation in the sphere of mind, and the emphasis of Froebel upon freedom. With Herbart, education will construct and instruct; and with Froebel, it will at the same time endeavour to secure the co-operation of the will of the pupil as the indispensable condition of success.

4. *Interest.* Interest may be defined as the hedonic aspect of thought. There persists an emotional element in the background of the mind. Of course thought proper, which in its characteristic form partakes of the nature of a stress or crisis, holds the foreground. What is called interest seems to be the background of feeling which shades into the more critical phases of consciousness. Interest cannot be said to be prior to attention, as Herbart held it to be, if it is the pleasure-pain aspect of attention. Yet, if it be regarded also as a background of which any part may upon occasion come into the focus of militant thought, interest would seem to play a part in motivation. It appears to assist the agent in securing a sufficiency of power to do something.

According to this account of interest, it can hardly be as it was for Herbart a product of the blend and fusion of ideas. Interest is perhaps rather a true psychic activity, an aspect of self-expression, a part of the efficient cause of man's realisation of himself in a world of objects. As descriptive of a state of mind, it involves a two-fold reference, to a natural tendency and an ideal for attainment. Usually pleasure is regarded as the end of interest. In so far as pleasure is a by-product of the realisation of the self in a world of objects, this may be dismissed as a psychological error. For if pleasure be a by-product, then to seek pleasure defeats its own end. Thus it seems to be an object rather than a feeling that is sought. Interest, then, would not seem to be something external which is set up as a standard to be achieved, so much as an original tendency accompanying activity. It is indeed the self-activity of Froebel regarded emotionally.

The psychology of Herbart is a psychology of ideas. Froebel's is less so, than a voluntaristic psychology. If this

broad distinction be maintained, a more synthetic statement may be made of the place of interest in a theory of education. Interest may be described as the hedonic aspect of the functioning of the self with a situation. This functioning is two-sided; it is conditioned by a past as with Herbart, and yet it is a primary impulse to realisation as with Froebel. Mental content is perhaps less the source than the aliment of interests. In the process of education, interests have less to be created than fed and controlled. It seems to follow that the ideal of a *many-sided* interest should give way in a measure to *best-sided* interest. For, on the side of origin, interests are impulses of which neither good nor bad is to be predicated. How then should they be at all indiscriminately or even equally developed? They are rather to be developed for the sake of the social situation. However, since interests are in the first place unmoral rather than immoral or moral, it is possible to make their very existence an argument for their cultivation. For even original powers and tendencies bear the stamp of a previous endorsement by the race; and the presumption is that few if any of them are mere excrescences in the contemporary social situation.

Over against education by interest has been set education by effort, or the disciplinary theory. Yet it is needless, and inconsistent with the facts, to oppose effort to interest. A synthetic attitude would only be debarred if effort implied distaste, or interest ease. But effort and interest are rather complementary. Perhaps there is no interest without effort. The prevalence of a contrary opinion may be due to a confusion of *effort* with the disagreeable. Probably, again, there is no effort without an interest, either mediated or immediate. It is commonly to be found that an interest at first external tends to become by effort more vital to the self. Thus if an Herbartian system of education pays too little attention to the developmental powers as such, a disciplinary system makes the error of disparaging mental content. But one does not train the will separately, nor the interests merely as such. Both are developed as related aspects of a unitary personality, and grow together as inseparably as control and freedom.

Finally, it may be well to summarise the conclusions which have been reached in the course of our attempt at a synthesis. The following tabulation may serve to recapitulate the line of thought that has been followed. But such is the nature of the present endeavour, that, taken of itself and apart from the previous context, a summary may prove to be neither intelligible nor convincing. Indeed, although at this stage, for the sake of greater clearness, the terminology of dogmatism may be employed, all that is said is intended only as the nucleus of a working hypothesis.

1. For Froebel, the mind is a unitary activity. For Herbart, ideas are independent activities. But it is possible to regard the ideas as dynamic, yet normally subject to a unitary will.

2. The psychology of Froebel is a psychology of will and attention. That of Herbart is a psychology of habit. But habit is essentially funded attention; and attention is habit accommodating itself to a "crisis."

3. The emphasis of Froebel is upon mental forms or unities; that of Herbart upon content. An evolutionary theory of the mind, which may be teleologically interpreted, may afford a synthetic interpretation of the unitary process from which these aspects have been abstracted. For, in the concrete, content and form are inseparable.

4. For Froebel, the Ego is a given principle or soul. For Herbart, the self is a construction. Froebel may be in the right to the extent that selfhood is implicitly given; and Herbart to the extent that it is not given explicitly.

5. The educational theory of Froebel emphasises the self; and that of Herbart the situation. But the self is a focus of the environment; and again, the environment is an objective manifestation of the agent self.

6. For Froebel, the will is free. For Herbart, the will is determined. But the synthetic hypothesis is tenable, that the self is in process of winning its way out of determination into freedom.

7. In his metaphysic, Herbart emphasises the unchangeable character of reality. On the other hand, the philosophy of Froebel assumes the reality of change. But for an ontology

of evolutionary idealism, reality involves change in the permanent, and permanence in change.

8. For Froebel as well as Herbart, character is the end of education. But Froebel aims at character in progress and Herbart at character in equilibrium. The true aim in education, from the standpoint of the individual, is a character of moving equilibrium or equilibrated progress.

9. The ideal of Herbart is a static perfection. That of Froebel is a progressive betterment. But while, from the standpoint of humanity, ideals are dynamic, yet viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* they may be perfect and complete.

10. Both Froebel and Herbart find that there is nothing good but the good will. But in the development of the good will, Herbart emphasises the intellect, and Froebel the emotions. The will, however, is the concrete mind, viewed as dynamic, of which feeling and intellect are the sectional phases. Emotion may be regarded as the periphery of thought, and thought as the focus of emotion.

11. For Herbart, ideas make the character. For Froebel, the development of potentialities makes the character. But character is less a product than a process; and potentialities and ideas are functional aspects of that process.

12. Herbart emphasises culture; Froebel, to a degree, nature. But nature, teleologically interpreted, is cultural. Nature, as origin, is not opposed to culture, as value; but these are terminal aspects of the education of man.

13. To a certain extent, Herbart emphasises curriculum the more; and Froebel method. But method is the curriculum as dynamic.

14. Herbart to a degree emphasises the technique, and Froebel the spirit of instruction. Technique should be informed with an aspect of subjectivism, or made one's own.

15. Herbart would educate by instruction, Froebel by development. But development and instruction are simply the subjective and objective aspects of the educative process.


16. Herbart does not educate for vocation; Froebel educates for "spiritual" vocation. Perhaps vocational training may be made both cultural and spiritual.

17. Herbart educates for individual perfection; Froebel for religious and institutional life. But a synthesis is possible, for true individuality implies institutionalism.

18. Froebel emphasises freedom in education; and Herbart, control. But the only trustworthy control, and the only effectual freedom, are synthesised in self-control.

19. For Herbart, education moves towards a socially determined pattern. For Froebel, it attempts to liberate the divine element in the individual. But, pragmatically, socialisation and liberation are one and the same.

20. Herbart aims at many-sided interest as a mental type. Froebel is more concerned with best-sided interest. Synthetically there are reasons for regarding the existence of interests as an argument for their development; but not for their fortuitous or even equal development.



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